



SINGAPORE 1000 SINGAPORE 500

Building trust in a connected world

CON

Securing the Intelligent Nation

Yu Chien Siang Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore





Agenda

- IT Security Challenges
- The Intelligent Nation
- Towards Intelligent Enterprises
- DORIS Personal Security System
- Conclusion




Singapore, hi-tech future



Singapore





Great Place Live !









Increasingly Hostile ICT Security Landscape

- Future systems (Web 2.0) will be much more complex, harder to understand and control.
- **IT Systems hold large data** repositories that have to be accessed securely by large groups of users in new ways.



The Straits Times, 1 Nov 2006



Tuesday October 3, 4:17 PM

Identity theft a top concern among Singaporeans: Survey ADVERTISEMENT Free study advice. Apply now for 2007. YAHOO! EDUCATION StudyLink

CHANNEL NEWSASIA

SINGAPORE: Identity theft and unauthorised access to personal information are the top security concerns among Singaporeans according to a survey conducted by Unisys, a security consulting firm.


The survey's index also found that Singaporeans put personal security ahead of national security.

Of the 899 respondents in the survey, 81 percent feel extremely concerned.

80 percent say they are very concerned about others obtaining their personal information.

What to look out for ...

- iN2015 programme
 - Ubiquitous networks
 - Dynamically evolving and agile enterprises
 - Ambient Intelligence
 - Robots and Slave Agents





- Broad-based system convergence (Computing Wave)
- Virtual Highways and National IT Infrastructure
- involving grid/utility computing
- Pervasive Virtualisation
- Digital Social Economy






Opportunistic Transactions

- Share petrol money to drive up to Malaysia.
- Cab drivers become DHL.
- Answer needs from Yahoo Answers, story of ad hoc delivery man.








ePayments - Securely done!





- ePayments
 - Pay by Touch
 - eWallets
 - New Visa payments
 - CEPAS
















Already Coming ...









NAI Ecosystem

NID



Global Authentication Infrastructure



National ID Providers

GAI

National SSP Regulator





eID Providers



Security Service Providers



Internet Service Providers



Authentication Operators

System Service Providers







Human User


Security Service Providers (SSP)

Traditional CA and Extensions

- Attribute certs
- Biometric certs
- Notary
 - eLegal, eContracts
 - Archiving
- Personal Security Mgt
 - Registration Service and eForms Filling
 - Grid Storage
 - Virtual Backend
 - Login Mgr, SSO
 - Workflow Mgr
 - eBallpoint Pen and Personal Backup
 - Locked down execution
- Secure Interfacing
 - Medium Mgr (Linkup to networks, sensors, embedded systems)
 - Secure Services Mgt, AJAX and Webservices
 - Directory Lookups

 Secure Collaboration and Social Networks

- Secure voice and conferencing
- Community membership
- Loyalty
- Rights, Relationships and Roles Mgt
- Secure Interaction and Presentation
 - Privacy
 - Anonymity
 - Virtual Card Services
 - Remote Access
- Secure Transaction
 - Record level audit and mgt
 - Proxy Mgt
 - Attributes Mgt and Agent Engagement
 - Print, Send and Delivery
 - Secure Time (sync and timed release)
 - Secure Payment
 - Sign and Seal
 - eVoting



Inventing own weapon - DORIS

(Digital Online Registration and Identification System)

Open-architecture Personal Security System



DORIS - Optimal Solution

- DORIS provides
 - Electronic ID
 - Online authentication
 - Offline authentication (INBAC)
- Based on Smart VIP

Tokens with Flat Surface



I-Stick, 2.5 x thicker than smart card. USB memory



C8-USB1

C6: n



Different Form Factors for PDA/Phones


- SDiD
- xD

NFC

- OLYMPUS DEFENSE H 1GB
- Secure MMC
- SIM overlay
- Next Gen SIM



SIM ÔME[™]







Contactless SIMoME (quarter of 2007)

Mobile DORIS Challenges

- High Cost
- USB vs MMC as a High Speed
 Interface for SIM cards
- OS support for mobile phones, SIM toolkit is too primitive and not GUI friendly (like DOS).






Personal Protection Device like M16

Accessories: Tripod, scope, IR, Grenade Laser sight, magazine Launcher **Bayonet**

Different Bullets: Tracer, Blanks, armour piercing

DORIS Demystified

 DORIS is not 2 Factor but n-factor supporting biometrics, ISO standards, Virtual Smart Cards and a Grid architecture.



DORIS Memory Map

	Doris Mini	DORIS
SmartVIP Lite (DG3 now up to 6k)	8k	8k
OTP Applet (8K) - Removed	Ok	8k
Certificate	2k	4k
Personal Folder (Scratch Pad)	~6k	~18k
App Slots (10x 1k slots)	10k	20k
Mifare Support	~1k	~1k
Keys (now with BioCrypto)	5k	5k
Total	32k	64k

DORIS Extensible Architecture

Grid Eco Code Portable Code (U3) Private Flash Store (Smart VIP Ultra Lite)

Web Services Virtual Smart Card Services(CardSpace)

Biometrics Private Folder Smart Card App Slots

Electronic Ballpoint Pen

Smart Card

ICAO Active Authentication (AA)

> ICAO Passive Authentication (PA)



USB Flash

Memory

Keep Operating System Simple

- Beyond PCs, beyond notebooks, beyond PDAs.
- Start from a small trusted core.
- Take over resources like CPU, mouse, Internet etc. Startup a Virtual PC.
- Talk to a trusted backend.
- Startup a Virtual Backend (remote server).
- Build your trusted applications dynamically and put everything on-demand.



no need to carr


a notebook or a PDA

Dynamic Isolation of Virtualised Applications (DIVA)

Like SunRay from Flash but offline too Prototype (in development) showing the concept of managing some common applications protected by DORIS (with flash) under a light protection "Sandbox".

- Restrict applications' File Input/Output transaction (no traces left on the host)
- Provide a Virtual On screen keyboard for secure user input (such as PIN) (bypasses user and kernel level

keylogger), web SSO.



BioCrypto – What is BioCrypto?


 BioCrypto is the derivation of a cryptographic key upon presentation of a live biometric like fingerprint or iris by using external data, like obfuscation cum thresholding or error correction.

Privacy Positive Search, with BioCrypto

- Extension of BioCrypto to do search in <1 second for many (60) millions of records.
- Privacy positive, we can search but no one knows who is being searched.
- Optimisation for PDA and handphones

and a Fingerprint Certificate. Privacy Positive Search





Innovative Design – Badge Holder



Accessories

- Wrist straps with a DORIS holder as Corporate Gifts, Fashion accessory!
- Similar to handphones accessories
 - Cover
 - Chain
 - Customisation & Personalisation (engraving, photos)







Initial Ideas

- 3 options:
 - -S\$5 Tri-interface chip only
 - -S\$20 to S\$30 Includes flash drive (512MB)
 - -S\$35 to S\$60 Secure Badge with fingerprint reader







Pilot Project @ SMU

- Student Card Project
- Issue DORIS I-Stick tokens to School of Information Systems students (about 600 in phase 1)
- Students to develop killer apps and others
- DORIS can support existing SMU gates



SMU Survey Results



Killer Applications

- E-government
- Health
- E-Payment support
- Telco "Find me, Follow me" VoIP phone
- Tourist Promotion applications
- Grid storage and Web Services Code
- Integrated IHL Visitor Management System
- Virtual Smart Cards
- Loyalty
- Emergency Card
- Education

Student

CPF: Biometrics for the Aged



MERICAN

unshine Rewar

KATRINA EMERCENCY ID CARD

ExpressID

WATER OVER



CardSpace with DORIS

- Microsoft CardSpace is an identity selector for Windows
- Enable users to provide their digital identity online in a more simple and secure way
- DORIS token further enhance it security by providing a strong 'nfactor' credentials for authenticating the Microsoft

Security Token Service (STS) when using CardSpace



- DORIS OTP is based on OATH
- 8Kb Java applet
- 2.13Kb Java applet
- 0.3Kb Applet-less






Issues with OTP

- Security Risks
 - Phishing
 - Man-in-the-middle attack
- Need for end-to-end security
- Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Specification (RFC 4226) on OTP
 - Need for secure channel to protect user's privacy and avoid replay attacks
 - Bi-Directional Authentication. Need to authenticate the validation server
- Implementation via 2-way SSL



Receipt for Your P	ayment to	phonebuy	er - Cyrillic	(Windows)					- 🗆 ×
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
8KB Java applet



Token containing OTP applet



2.13KB Java applet




Token containing OTP applet

OTP reader



- 0.3KB Applet-less



• Different solutions for different needs

	8K Java applet	2.13K Java applet	0.3K Applet-less
Size	8K	2.13K	0.3K
Security	Secret and counter never leave the token	Secret and counter never leave the token	Secret and counter leaves the Token hence OTP reader must be secure
Performance	594 ms	485 ms	531 ms
Deployment Considerations	Simple OTP readers can be issued to users	OTP readers to be issued to users must be able to do	User must be present when personalizing OTP reader and token
		computation	

Our Open Source Efforts

- DORIS is based on ECC public key crypto.
- ECC libraries
 - BorZoi (Dragongate Technologies Ltd) <u>http://dragongate-technologies.com/products.html#borZoi</u>
 - Mircal (Shamus Software Ltd) <u>http://indigo.ie/~mscott/</u>
 - OpenSSL (for P curves) <u>http://www.openssl.org</u>
- OTP Java card applet
 - MHA OATH


http://www.ida.gov.sg/idaweb/techdev/infopage.jsp?infopag ecategory=articles:techdev&versionid=1&infopageid=I3427

- Demo codes
 - Available at

http://www.governmentware2006.com/download.html

ECDSA Verification

 DORIS token's ECDSA P192 curve has been validated by NIST using tests described in Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Validation System (ECDSAVS)



- ECDSA Validation List <u>http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/dss/ecdsaval.html</u>
- A simple test can be conducted by loading the test key pair into the ecdsa test applet and

compute the signature based on the test messages

Joining Community ...



 We have now a community of more than 50 companies supporting DORIS. A good number of DORIS Pilot projects, based on DORIS tokens, on loan. Contact us, please.

We welcome you



CONSTRACTORS

Basic DORIS features

- Self Enrollment Kiosk
 - Lucky Draw
- Authentication
 - Contact interface
 - Contactless interface
- Electronic Signature
 - Acrobat signing
- Door Access System

Application based

- Mobile Doris
 - SDiD card
 - NFC enabled phone
- OTP (with and without pass phrase)
 - PDA OTP Reader
 - NFC OTP Reader
 - Various Applet versions
- DIVA
 - Anti-key logging
 - SSO
 - File redirection

Cardspace

eBanking DORIS login

