# Differentially private secure distributed logistic regression 

Xiaoqian Jiang<br>Biomedical Informatics<br>University of California San Diego

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## Many attack models have been discovered...

- Malin 2005: Trails of hospital visit pattern might lead to information disclosure
- Machanavajjhala 2007: Demographic statistics for certain cohort can lead to privacy lea kage.
- Loukides 2010: Distribution of disease can lead to re-identification
- Sweeney 2014: Demographics combined with phenotypes provide strong clues to reveal individuals' information
- Bonomi 2017: Hospital visit frequency and interval can lead to re-identification


## Homomorphic encryption and differential privacy might help




Privacy-Preserving Distributed Predictive Models

## Two Representative Scenarios



## Logistic Regression



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## Learning a distributed logistic regression

- Support $p-1$ features are c onsistent over $k$ sites
- In each iteration, intermed iary result of a pxp matrix and a $p$-dimensional vecto $r$ are transmitted to the ce ntral site for optimization



## Maximum Likelihood Estimation

- Estimated probability based on observations of a binary response $Y$ and covariates $X$
- Likelihood function based on observed data (centralized)


$$
l(\beta)=\sum_{1}^{n}\left[y_{i} \log \pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)+\left(1-y_{i}\right) \log \left(1-\pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)\right)\right]
$$

## Maximum Likelihood Estimation

- Likelihood function based on observed data (distributed)

$$
P(Y=1 \mid X)=\pi(X, \beta)=\frac{1}{1+e^{-X \beta}}
$$

Number of records held by site A

$$
l(\beta)=\sum_{1}\left[y_{i} \log \pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)+\left(1-y_{i}\right) \log \left(1-\pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)\right)\right]
$$

## Maximum Likelihood Estimation

- Newton-Raphson algorithm for calculation

$$
P(Y=1 \mid X)=\pi(X, \beta)=\frac{1}{1+e^{-X \beta}}
$$

$l(\beta)$ is a concave

$$
\Rightarrow l(\beta)=\sum_{1}^{n_{A}+n_{B}}\left[y_{i} \log \pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)+\left(1-y_{i}\right) \log \left(1-\pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)\right)\right]
$$

$$
\beta^{(k+1)}=\beta^{(k)}-\left[\frac{\partial^{2} l\left(\beta^{(k)}\right)}{\partial \beta^{(k)} \partial \beta^{(k)^{T}}}\right]^{-1} \frac{\partial l\left(\beta^{(k)}\right)}{\partial \beta^{(k)}}
$$

## Newton-Raphson (NR) Algorithm


$l(\boldsymbol{\beta})=\sum_{i=1}^{D}\left\{\boldsymbol{\beta}^{T} \sum_{l \in \mathcal{D}_{i}} \mathbf{z}^{l}-d_{i} \log \left[\sum_{l \in \mathcal{R}_{i}} \exp \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}^{T} \mathbf{z}^{l}\right)\right]\right\}$

$$
\beta^{(k+1)}=\beta^{(k)}-\left[\frac{\partial^{2} l\left(\beta^{(k)}\right)}{\partial \beta^{(k)} \partial \beta^{(k)}}\right]^{-1} \frac{\partial l\left(\beta^{(k)}\right)}{\partial \beta^{(k)}}
$$

## Distributed Newton-Raphson (NR) Algorithm

$$
l(\beta)=\sum_{1}^{n_{A}+n_{B}}\left[y_{i} \log \pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)+\left(1-y_{i}\right) \log \left(1-\pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)\right)\right]
$$

## Distributed Newton-Raphson (NR) Algorithm

$$
l(\beta)=\sum_{1}^{n_{A}+n_{B}}\left[y_{i} \log \pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)+\left(1-y_{i}\right) \log \left(1-\pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)\right)\right]
$$

## Distributed Newton-Raphson (NR) Algorithm

$$
l(\beta)=\sum_{1}^{n_{A}+n_{B}}\left[y_{i} \log \pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)+\left(1-y_{i}\right) \log \left(1-\pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)\right)\right]
$$

$$
\beta^{(k+1)}=\beta^{(k)}-\left[\frac{\partial^{2} l\left(\beta^{(k)}\right)}{\partial \beta^{(k)} \partial \beta^{(k)^{T}}}\right]^{-1} \frac{\partial l\left(\beta^{(k)}\right)}{\partial \beta^{(k)}}
$$

$$
=\beta^{(k)}+\left[\bar{X} \bigcirc\left(\bar{X}, \beta^{(k)}\right) \bar{X}\right]^{-1} \bar{X}^{T}\left[\bar{Y}-\left(\bar{I}\left(\bar{x}, \beta^{(k)}\right)\right]\right.
$$



[^0]Global prediction outcomes

## Distributed Newton-Raphson (NR) Algorithm

$$
l(\beta)=\sum_{1}^{n_{A}+n_{B}}\left[y_{i} \log \pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)+\left(1-y_{i}\right) \log \left(1-\pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)\right)\right]
$$

$$
\beta^{(k+1)}=\beta^{(k)}-\left[\frac{\partial^{2} l\left(\beta^{(k)}\right)}{\partial \beta^{(k)} \partial \beta^{(k)^{T}}}\right]^{-1} \frac{\partial l\left(\beta^{(k)}\right)}{\partial \beta^{(k)}}
$$

$$
=\beta^{(k)}+\left[\bar{X}^{T} W\left(\bar{X}, \beta^{(k)}\right) \bar{X}\right]^{-1} \bar{X}^{T}\left[\bar{Y}-\Pi\left(\bar{X}, \beta^{(k)}\right)\right]
$$

$$
=\beta^{(k)}+\left[\bar{X}_{A}^{7} W_{A}\left(\bar{X}_{A}, \beta^{(k)}\right) \bar{X}_{A}+\bar{X}_{B}^{T} W_{B}\left(\bar{X}_{B}, \beta^{(k)}\right) \bar{X}_{B}\right]^{-1}
$$

$$
\cdot\left\{\bar{X}^{T} / / \bar{Y}_{A}-\Pi_{B}\left(\bar{x}_{X}, \beta\right)+\bar{X}_{B}^{T}\left[\bar{Y}_{B}-\Pi_{B}\left(\bar{X}_{B}, \beta\right)\right]\right\} .
$$

Local variance-covariance matrix ${ }^{\text {² }}$ Local prediction outcomes

## Distributed Newton-Raphson (NR) Algorithm

$$
l(\beta)=\sum_{1}^{n_{A}+n_{B}}\left[y_{i} \log \pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)+\left(1-y_{i}\right) \log \left(1-\pi\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)\right)\right]
$$



## What remains to be solved?

- Masking the pattern before transmitting

- Using secure primitive to safe guard the communication



## Differential Privacy \& homomorphic encryption

- A privacy mechanism $A$ gives $\varepsilon$-differential privacy if for all neighbourin $g$ databases $D, D^{\prime}$, and for any possible output $S \in \operatorname{Range}(\mathrm{~A}), \operatorname{Pr}[\mathrm{A}(\mathrm{D})$
$=S] \leq \exp (\varepsilon) \times \operatorname{Pr}\left[A\left(D^{\prime}\right)=S\right]$
- $D$ and $D^{\prime}$ are neighboring databases if they differ on at most one record
- Homomorphic encryption is a type of encryption that allows computation conducted on ciphertext, when results are decrypted, map exactly to those of the corresponding computation on the plaintext



## Differential private logistic regression

- We perturb the objective function by adding an additional term $\frac{b^{T} \beta}{n}$ with $b$ drawn from a Laplacian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation $\frac{2}{\epsilon}$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \max _{\beta}\left[l(\beta)=-\sum_{i=1}^{n} \log \left(1+\exp \left(-y_{i} \beta^{T} Z_{i}\right)-\frac{\lambda}{2} \beta^{T} \beta-\frac{b^{T} \beta}{n}\right]\right. \\
& \beta^{\text {new }}=\beta^{\text {old }}-\left[l^{\prime \prime}\left(\beta^{o l d}\right)\right]^{-1} l^{\prime}\left(\beta^{\text {old }}\right) \\
& \quad=\beta^{\text {old }}+\left(Z^{T} W^{\text {old }} Z+\lambda I\right)^{-1}\left[Z^{T}\left(Y-\mu^{o l d}\right)-\lambda \beta^{\text {old }}-\frac{b^{T}}{n}\right] \\
& Z^{T} W^{\text {old }} Z=\sum_{k} Z_{k}^{T} W_{k}^{\text {old }} Z_{k}, Z^{T}\left[Y-\mu^{o l d}\right]=\sum_{k} Z_{k}^{T}\left[Y_{k}-\mu_{k}^{o l d}\right], b=\sum_{k} b_{k} \\
& k \in(1, \ldots, K)
\end{aligned}
$$

## Differentially private logistic regression for distributed data

In a distributed setting, objective perturbation can be achieved by

- Gamma Distributed Perturbation Laplacian algorithm (DPLA)
- Gauss Distributed Perturbation Laplacian algorithm (DPLA)
- Laplace Distributed Perturbation Laplacian algorithm (DPLA)


## Differentially private logistic regression for distributed data

- Note that the noise added by a single party is not sufficient to ensure DP!
- If we add too much noise, the final output will be less valuable.
- If we add too little noise, it is not enough to protect the privacy.
- Privacy mechanisms are not designed to provide security of computations.
- We need to protect the intermediary results, otherwise, privacy cannot be ensured in a global manner


## Algorithm

## Win-Win Strategy

$$
\begin{aligned}
\beta^{\text {new }} & =\beta^{\text {old }}-\left[l^{\prime \prime}\left(\beta^{\text {old }}\right)\right]^{-1} l^{\prime}\left(\beta^{\text {old }}\right) \\
& =\beta^{\text {old }}+\frac{\left(\sum_{k} Z_{k}^{T} W_{k}^{\text {old }} Z_{k}+\frac{\lambda}{K} I\right)^{-1}\left[\frac{\sum_{k}\left(Z_{k}^{T}\left[Y_{k}-\mu_{k}^{\text {old }}\right]-\frac{\lambda}{K} \beta^{\text {old }}\right)-\left(\sum_{k} \frac{1}{n} b_{k}\right)^{T}}{\text { Hessian }=H}\right]}{\text { Gradient }=g}
\end{aligned}
$$

- Homomorphic Encryption with "Fixed Hessian"

One time
$-\quad \sum_{k} Z_{k}^{T} W_{k}^{o l d} Z_{k}+\frac{\lambda}{K} I=\sum_{k} H_{k} \approx \sum_{k} \frac{1}{4} Z_{k}^{T} Z_{k}+\frac{\lambda}{K} I=\sum_{k} \bar{H}_{k} \approx \sum_{k} \operatorname{diag}\left(\bar{H}_{k}\right)=\sum_{k} \widetilde{H}_{k} \quad \boldsymbol{E n c}\left(\widetilde{\boldsymbol{H}}_{\boldsymbol{k}}\right)^{\downarrow}$

- $Z^{T}\left[Y-\mu^{o l d}\right]-\lambda \beta^{o l d}-\frac{1}{n} b=\sum_{k} Z_{k}^{T}\left[Y_{k}-\mu_{k}^{o l d}\right]-\frac{\lambda}{K} \beta^{o l d}-\sum_{k} \frac{1}{n} b_{k}=\sum_{k} g_{k} \quad \boldsymbol{E n c}\left(\boldsymbol{g}_{\boldsymbol{k}}\right)^{\downarrow}$
- Differential Privacy
$-\quad \beta^{\text {new }}$ can be revealed to parties because of the noise
- HE can be renewed every iteration

Based on DP, we can reduce time complexity and error accumulation of HE

## SMC Schemes with HE under Fixed Hessian



Approximation of fixed Hessian and gradient

## SMC Schemes with HE under Fixed Hessian



Approximation of fixed Hessian and gradient
$\widetilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$ can be revealed to parties because of the noise.

## SMC Schemes with HE under Fixed Hessian



Approximation of fixed Hessian and gradient

$$
\text { A few iterations } \rightarrow \text { Converge }
$$

## Limitations of Fixed Hessian

$$
\sum_{k} Z_{k}^{T} W_{k}^{o l d} Z_{k}+\frac{\lambda}{K} I=\sum_{k} H_{k} \approx \sum_{k} \frac{1}{4} Z_{k}^{T} Z_{k}+\frac{\lambda}{K} I=\sum_{k} \bar{H}_{k} \approx \sum_{k} \operatorname{diag}\left(\bar{H}_{k}\right)=\sum_{k} \widetilde{H}_{k}
$$

- Simple approximation of Hessian using only its diagonal elements
- Valid when the matrix strongly diagonally dominant
- Large enough $\lambda$ to be set

Largely dependent on $\lambda$

- Better diagonal Hessian approximation

Diagonal Updating via Quasi-Cauchy Relation

## Diagonal Updating via Quasi-Cauchy Relation*

$$
\nabla^{2} f(x)=\nabla^{2} f_{A}(x)+\nabla^{2} f_{B}(x)
$$

where $\nabla^{2} f_{A}(x)$ : a diagonal matrix consisting the diagonal entries of the Hessian
$\nabla^{2} f_{B}(x)$ : the actual Hessian except that its diagonal entries are all zero

$$
\nabla^{2} f(x) \approx D=\Psi_{1}+\Psi_{2}=\Psi_{1}+\left(\theta I+\Psi_{3}\right)
$$

where $\Psi_{1}$ : a positive definite diagonal matrix

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\min & \frac{1}{2}\left\|\Psi_{3}\right\|_{F}^{2}, \\
\text { s.t. } & s_{i}^{T}\left(\Psi_{1}+\left(\theta I+\Psi_{3}\right)\right) s_{i}=s_{i}^{T} y_{i} \text { and } \Psi_{3} \text { is diagonal } \\
\qquad D_{i+1}=D_{i}+\frac{s_{i}^{T} y_{i}-s_{i}^{T} \Psi_{1} s_{i}-\theta_{i} s_{i}^{T} s_{i}}{\operatorname{tr}\left(E_{i}^{2}\right)} E_{i}
\end{array}
$$

where $\theta_{i}=\min \left[1, \frac{s_{i}^{T} y_{i}-s_{i}^{T} \Psi_{1} s_{i}}{s_{i}^{T} s_{i}}\right]$ for positive definiteness and $E_{i}=\operatorname{diag}\left(s_{i, 1}^{2}, s_{i, 2}^{2}, \ldots, s_{i, m}^{2}\right)$

[^1]
## Diagonal Updating via Quasi-Cauchy Relation

## Decomposable

$$
D_{i+1}=D_{i}+\frac{s_{i}^{T} y_{i}-s_{i}^{T} \Psi_{1} s_{i}-\theta_{i} s_{i}^{T} s_{i}}{\operatorname{tr}\left(E_{i}^{2}\right)} E_{i},
$$

$$
\frac{s_{i}^{T} y_{i}-s_{i}^{T} \Psi_{1} s_{i}}{\operatorname{tr}\left(E_{i}^{2}\right)} E_{i}-\theta_{i} \cdot \frac{s_{i}^{T} s_{i}}{\operatorname{tr}\left(E_{i}^{2}\right)} E_{i}=\sum_{k=1}^{K} V_{i k}-\theta_{i} \cdot W_{i}
$$

$$
\text { where } s_{i}=\beta^{i+1}-\beta^{i}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& y_{i}=\sum_{k}\left(Z_{k}^{T}\left[Y_{k}-\mu_{k}^{i+1}\right]-\frac{\lambda}{K} \beta^{i+1}\right)-\sum_{k}\left(Z_{k}^{T}\left[Y_{k}-\mu_{k}^{i}\right]-\frac{\lambda}{K} \beta^{i}\right) \\
& V_{i k}=\frac{s_{i k}^{T} y_{i}-s_{i}^{T} \Psi_{1} s_{i}}{\operatorname{tr}\left(E_{i}^{2}\right)} E_{i}, W_{i}=\frac{s_{i}^{T} s_{i}}{\operatorname{tr}\left(E_{i}^{2}\right)} E_{i}
\end{aligned}
$$

- For positive definiteness

$$
-\theta_{i}=\min \left[1, \frac{s_{i}^{T} y_{i}-s_{i}^{T} \Psi_{1} s_{i}}{s_{i}^{T} s_{i}}\right]
$$

- Comparison within ciphertext is not easy, so we used one more round of iteraction

One more step is added every iteration.

## Positive Definiteness

$$
\theta_{i}=\min \left[1, \frac{\left.\begin{array}{c}
\text { Decomposable } \\
\left.\frac{s_{i}^{T} y_{i}-s_{i}^{T} \Psi_{1} s_{i}}{s_{i}^{T} s_{i}}\right]
\end{array}\right] \min \left[1, \Sigma_{k} C_{i k}\right]}{}\right.
$$

$$
\text { where } C_{i k}=\frac{s_{i}^{T} y_{i k}}{s_{i}^{T} s_{i}}-\frac{s_{i}^{T} \Psi_{1} s_{i}}{K s_{i}^{T} s_{i}}
$$

$$
\text { 4. } \operatorname{Dec}\left(\xi_{2}\left(\Sigma_{k} C_{k}+\xi_{1}\right)\right)=\xi_{2}\left(\Sigma_{k} C_{k}+\xi_{1}\right)
$$

$$
\operatorname{Dec}\left(\xi_{2}\left(1+\xi_{1}\right)\right)=\xi_{2}\left(1+\xi_{1}\right)
$$

$\underline{i-t h ~ i t e r a t i o n ~}$

5. $\min \left[\xi_{2}\left(\Sigma_{k} C_{k}+\xi_{1}\right), \xi_{2}\left(1+\xi_{1}\right)\right]$
6. $\operatorname{Enc}\left(\min \left[\xi_{2}\left(\Sigma_{k} C_{k}+\xi_{1}\right), \xi_{2}\left(1+\xi_{1}\right)\right]\right)$

1. $\operatorname{Enc}\left(\Sigma_{k} C_{k}\right)=\Sigma_{k} \operatorname{Enc}\left(C_{k}\right)$
2. Random number $\xi_{1}, \xi_{2}$ generation
3. $\operatorname{Enc}\left(\xi_{2}\left(\Sigma_{k} C_{k}+\xi_{1}\right)\right), \operatorname{Enc}\left(\xi_{2}\left(1+\xi_{1}\right)\right)$
4. $\operatorname{Enc}\left(\min \left[\Sigma_{k} C_{k}, 1\right]\right)$
$=\operatorname{Enc}\left(\min \left[\xi_{2}\left(\Sigma_{k} C_{k}-\xi_{1}\right), \xi_{2}\left(1+\xi_{1}\right)\right]\right)$

$$
/ E n c\left(\xi_{2}^{-1}\right)-\operatorname{Enc}\left(\xi_{1}\right)
$$

## SMC Schemes with HE under Updating Hessian

i-th iteration


Approximation of Hessian and gradient

## SMC Schemes with HE under Updating Hessian

i-th iteration


Approximation of Hessian and gradient

$$
\widetilde{\beta} \text { can be revealed to parties because of the noise. }
$$

## SMC Schemes with HE under Updating Hessian



Approximation of Hessian and gradient

$$
\text { A few iterations } \rightarrow \text { Converge }
$$

## Trade-Off between Fixed Hessian and Updating Hessian

|  | Fixed Hessian | Updating Hessian |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The number of Iterations | $\uparrow$ | $\downarrow$ |
| Time per iteration | $\downarrow$ | $\uparrow$ |

- Fixed Hessian
- Iteration numbers are too dependent on $\lambda$ which is also depending on data.
- The number of iterations can be more than 100 when not big enough $\lambda$.
- Updating Hessian
- Iteration numbers are quite robust on $\lambda$.
- Inverse diagonal Hessian is not that much expensive ( $\because$ vector computation).


## Dataset: Death in hospital

- PhysioNet Challenge 2012 [MIMIC II database]
- Dataset comprised of 4000 patient stays in the ICU lasting at least 2 days for predicting mortality.
- The data were formatted as time-stamped measurements for 37 distinct variables.
- Four static variables (age, gender, height, and initial weight) are also present.
$>$ Number of patients: 4000, Number of features: 41


## Data Preprocessing

Percentage of patients for whom at least one measurement was available during the first 48 ICU hours

| Measurement | \% | Measurement | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ABP (Arterial blood pressure) |  | Heart rate | 98.4 |
| Invasive (diastolic, mean, systolic) | 98.4 | K (Serum potassium) | 97.9 |
| Non-invasive (diastolic) | 87.3 | Lactate | 54.8 |
| Non-invasive (mean) | 87.2 | Mg (Serum magnesium) | 97.5 |
| Non-invasive (systolic) | 87.6 | Mechanical ventilation | 63.1 |
| Albumin | 40.5 | Na (Serum sodium) | 98.2 |
| ALP (Alkaline phosphatase) | 42.4 | PaCO 2 | 75.4 |
| ALT (Alkaline transaminase) | 43.4 | PaO 2 | 75.4 |
| AST (Aspartate transaminase) | 43.4 | pH | 75.9 |
| Bilirubin | 43.4 | Platelets | 98.3 |
| BUN (Blood urea nitrogren) | 98.4 | Respiration rate | 27.7 |
| Cholesterol | 7.9 | SaO 2 | 44.7 |
| Creatinine | 98.4 | Temperature | 98.4 |
| FiO 2 (Fractional inspired oxygen) | 67.6 | Troponin-I | 4.7 |
| Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) | 98.4 | Troponin-T | 21.9 |
| Glucose | 97.5 | Urine output | 97.4 |
| HCO3 (Serum bicarbonate) | 98.2 | WBC (White blood cell count) | 98.2 |
| HCT (Hematocrit) | 98.4 | Weight | 67.7 |

1. Compute min, max, mean, first value, last value as a way to represent time-series features
2. Missing values are replaced by the mean value of a feature.

Number of patients: 4,000, Number of features: 189

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## Experiment

- Models

1) (Distributed) model without differential privacy

For $b \sim \operatorname{Lap}(0, \sqrt{2} / \epsilon)$ with $2 / \epsilon$ standard deviation
2) Model with Gamma DLPA and HE
3) Model with Gauss DLPA and HE
4) Model with Laplace DLPA and HE

- Scenario
- 3 sites with equal sizes
- Comparison
- 10 repetitions of 4-fold CV
- AUC
- Mean of coefficients
- Standard deviation of coefficients


## Reference Result without HE

- Averaged AUC on plaintext
(Distributed) logistic regression without differential privacy: reference


Gauss << Laplace $\approx$ Gamma

## Gauss DPLA with HE

## Budget: $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}$ /iterations



## Gamma DPLA with HE

Budget: $\epsilon /$ iterations


## Laplace DPLA with HE

Budget: $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}$ /iterations


Same tendency: Gauss << Laplace $\approx$ Gamma

## Time Complexity

|  | Fixed Hessian | Updating Hessian |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The number of Iterations | $\uparrow$ | $\downarrow$ |
| Time per iteration | $\downarrow$ | $\uparrow$ |


|  | $\lambda$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 10 | 100 | 500 |
|  | Fixed Hessian |  |  |
| Iterations | 50 | 100 | 300 |
| Time (s) | 26.33 | 49.36 | 142.39 |
|  | Trade-off depending on the number of iterations |  |  |
|  | Updated Hessian |  |  |
| Iterations | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| Time (s) | 131.72 | 132.23 | 131.22 |

We confirmed win-win strategy!

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Q\&A


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[^0]:    Global variance-covariance matrix

[^1]:    * Marjugi and Leong (2013) Diagonal Hessian Approximation for Limited Memory Quasi-Newton via Variational Principle, Journal of Applied Mathematics

