

Set Values for Mean Field Games with Multiple Equilibria

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with Melih Zgeli

Also Fermanian, Rudloff, Z. (2020)

Consider simple setting in the talk, but

$d > 1$ ✓

Common noise ✓

path dependence ✓

Volatility control ??

I. Mean field games.

1. N-player game : $i=1, \dots, N$

Control : $\vec{\alpha} := (\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N)$

state : $X_t^i = x_i + \int_0^t b(s, X_s^i, \mu_s^N, \alpha_s^i) ds + B_t$
 $\mu_t^N := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N S_{X_t^j}$

Utility : $J_i(x_i, \mu_0^N; \vec{\alpha}) := E \left[g(X_T^i, \mu_T^N) + \int_0^T f(s, X_s^i, \mu_s^N, \alpha_s^i) ds \right]$

Def. $\vec{\alpha}^*$ is a NE if , for $i=1, \dots, N$,

$$J_i(x_i, \mu_0^N; \vec{\alpha}^*) = \sup_{\alpha^i} J_i(x_i, \mu_0^N; \vec{\alpha}^{*, -i}, \alpha^i)$$

2. Mean field game .

"Others": $X_t^\alpha = \xi + \int_0^t b(s, X_s^\alpha, \mu_s^\alpha, \alpha_s) ds + B_t$

"individual": $X_t^{\alpha, \alpha'} = x + \int_0^t b(s, X_s^{\alpha, \alpha'}, \mu_s^\alpha, \alpha'_s) ds + B'_t$

Utility : $J(x, \mu, \alpha, \alpha') := E \left[g(X_T^{\alpha, \alpha'}, \mu_T^\alpha) + \int_0^T f(s, X_s^{\alpha, \alpha'}, \mu_s^\alpha, \alpha'_s) ds \right]$

Optimal value: $\bar{J}(x, \mu; \alpha) := \sup_{\alpha'} J(x, \mu; \alpha, \alpha')$

Def. α^* is an MFE if:

$$J(x, \mu; \alpha^*, \alpha^*) = \bar{J}(x, \mu; \alpha^*), \quad \text{M-a.e. } x$$

Note: $\bar{J}(\cdot, \cdot; \mu, \alpha)$ is the solution to a standard HJB, and thus has desired regularities .

3. Assume α^* is unique,

Denote $V(0, x, \mu) := \bar{J}(x, \mu; \alpha^*)$

Two main problems in the literature:

(i) Master equation for $V(t, x, \mu)$ \leftarrow game from E^t, T

(ii) $V_N(0, x, \mu_0^N) \rightarrow V(0, x, \mu)$ if $\mu_0^N \rightarrow \mu$

Question: what if α^* is not unique?

II. The set value: heuristic discussions

0. Set value: $V(0, x, \mu) \cancel{:=} \{ \bar{J}(x, \mu, \alpha^*) : \text{all MFE } \alpha^* \} \subset \mathbb{R}$

Note: (i) α^* is common for all players, Not for the individual player " x "

(ii) Master equation is local for μ , but global for x .


So we should define $V(t, \mu)$, Note $V(t, x, \mu)$.

1. N-player: $V^N(0, \mu_0^N) := \{ (J_1(x_1, \mu_0^N; \vec{\alpha}^*), \dots, J_N(x_N, \mu_0^N; \vec{\alpha}^*)) : \text{all } \vec{\alpha}^* \} \subset \mathbb{R}^N$

MFG: $V(0, \mu) := \{ \bar{J}(\cdot, \mu; \alpha^*) : \text{all MFG } \alpha^* \} \subset \mathcal{C}^0(\mathbb{R})$

Q1. $V^N(0, \mu_0^n) \rightarrow V(0, \mu)$ if $\mu_0^n \rightarrow \mu$?

2. for the dynamic set value $V(t, \mu)$,
do we have DPP?



$$V(0, \mu) \neq \{ \bar{J}(t, \cdot; 0, \cdot, \mu; \alpha^*) : \quad \downarrow \quad \uparrow \\$$

$\forall \gamma: \mathcal{P}_2 \rightarrow C^0(\mathbb{R})$ s.t. $\gamma(v) \in V(t, v), \forall v$

all MFE α^* for the MFG on $[0, t]$ with terminal condit γ

No.: If $V(t, \mu) = \{ V(t, \cdot, \mu) \}$

is a singleton, this is exactly the standard DPP.

3. Information of the Controls.

FRZ (2020)

	$V^N \rightarrow V$	DPP	DPP
(i) $\alpha_t = \alpha_t(B_{[0, t]})$	✓	✗	✗
(ii) $\alpha_t = \alpha_t(x_t) / \alpha_t(x_t, \mathbb{P}_{x_t})$	✓	✓	✗
(iii) $\alpha_t = \alpha_t(x_{[0, t]}) /$ $\alpha_t(x_{[0, t]}, \mathbb{P}_{x_{[0, t]}})$	✓	✓	✓

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4. state dependent or path dependent?

Note: In stochastic control, usually ~~admissible controls~~^{path-dep.},
but state dependent optimal controls.

However, for games, in general.

$$IV_{\text{state}}(t, \mu) \neq IV_{\text{path}}(t, \mu).$$

We shall use $\alpha_t(x_t)$ in the rest of the talk.

Note: if we use $\alpha_t(x_{[0,t]})$,

the set value will also be path dependent,

so we need to consider $IV(t, \underline{\alpha}_{x_{[0,t]}})$

II. The rigorous result

0. Note: the above "results" are indeed true in discrete model
But, for cont model,

for fixed μ , $IV(t, \mu) \subset C^0(\mathbb{R})$ measurable?

Is the map $\mu \in \mathcal{P}_2(\mathbb{R}) \mapsto IV(t, \mu)$ measurable?

1. 2-MFE.

Def. α^ε is an ε -MFE at μ if:

$$M(x: J(x, \mu; \alpha^\varepsilon, \alpha^\varepsilon) \geq \bar{J}(x, \mu; \alpha^\varepsilon) - \varepsilon) = \cancel{\cancel{1}} \geq 1 - \varepsilon.$$

2. The set value:

$$W_\varepsilon(t, \mu) := \left\{ \varphi \in C^0(\mathbb{R}) : \sup_x |\bar{J}(t, x, \mu, \alpha^\varepsilon) - \varphi(x)| \leq \varepsilon \text{ for all } \alpha^\varepsilon \right\}$$

$$\bar{W}(t, \mu) := \bigcap_{\varepsilon > 0} W_\varepsilon(t, \mu).$$

Note: (i) $\bar{W}(t, \mu) \neq \emptyset \Leftrightarrow W_\varepsilon(t, \mu) \neq \emptyset, \forall \varepsilon > 0$

(ii) MFE $\bar{A}(t, \mu) \neq \emptyset \Rightarrow A_\varepsilon(t, \mu) \neq \emptyset \quad \begin{matrix} \uparrow \\ \text{set of } \varepsilon\text{-MFE} \end{matrix}$

3. $\bar{W}_N \rightarrow \bar{W}$
and \bar{W} satisfies DPP ✓

$$\bar{W}_\varepsilon^N(0, \mu_0^N) := \left\{ \varphi \in C_K^0(\mathbb{R}) : \sup_{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{mod. of cont.}}} |\bar{J}(x_i, \mu_0^N, \vec{\alpha}^\varepsilon) - \varphi(x_i)| \leq \varepsilon \text{ all } \vec{\alpha}^\varepsilon \right\}$$

$$\bigcap_{\varepsilon > 0} \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{W}_\varepsilon^N(0, \mu_0^N) = \bar{W}(0, \mu) = \bigcap_{\varepsilon > 0} \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{W}_\varepsilon^N(0, \mu_0^N)$$

Question: how to pick an "optimal" value in the set?

$$\text{e.g. } \sup_{\gamma \in N(0, \mu)} \int f(x) \mu(dx).$$