


## Composition of Metric-Fair Algorithms

### Recall: Individual (aka Metric) Fairness

"Similar people" have similar probabilities of "Yes" and "No" outcomes



 $C: U \to \Delta(0)$  $||C(x) - C(y)|| \le d(x, y)$ 

### Pop Quiz


• Does Individual Fairness address the equal FPR, FNR, PPV problem?



## Intuition

If all of the parts are fair, then the whole should be fair.









# Reality

It's complicated.



### Task-Competitive Composition

Tasks 'compete' for individuals.

- Example: Advertisers compete for a single ad slot
- Goal: Individual Fairness for tech jobs advertising and groceries advertising *simultaneously*



tech firm vs grocery delivery service

### Naïve Task-Competitive Composition



Grocery service decides whether to bid (\$1)



Tech company bids among those not claimed by groceries (\$0.50)

### Not Guaranteed to be Fair


**Theorem.** For any two tasks T and T' with nontrivial metrics D, D', and for any tiebreaking function, not necessarily the same for each individual, there exist classifiers C and C' that are individually fair in isolation, but when naïvely combined violate multiple task fairness.

A metric is trivial if all distances are in {0,1}

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**Theorem.** For any two tasks T and T' with nontrivial metrics D, D', and for any tiebreaking function, not necessarily the same for each individual, there exist classifiers C and C' that are individually fair in isolation, but when naïvely combined violate multiple task fairness. Proof Sketch (for case ties go to T)

- $0 < p_u < p_v$
- p<sub>u</sub>' ≥ p<sub>v</sub>' > 0 and the distance is maximized subject to D'.



A metric is trivial if all distances are in {0,1}

### Proof Sketch (continued)

The difference in probability of positive classification for T':


$$(1-p_u)p_u' - (1-p_v)p_v' = D'(u,v) + p_v p'_v - p_u p'_u$$

If D'(u,v) = 0 then done:  $(p_u < p_{v_i}; p_u' = p_v' > 0)$ 

Write 
$$\alpha = p_v/p_u \operatorname{so} p_v p'_v - p_u p'_u = \alpha p_u p'_v - p_u p'_u$$
  
 $\alpha p_u p'_v - p_u p'_u > 0 \Leftrightarrow$   
 $\alpha p'_v - p'_u > 0 \Leftrightarrow$   
 $\alpha = p_v/p_u > p'_u/p'_v$ 

Easy to ensure w/o violating fairness for T. Omitted: a bit of cleanup for other elements. Proof Sketch (for case ties go to T)

- $0 < p_u < p_v$
- p<sub>u</sub>' ≥ p<sub>v</sub>' > 0 and the distance is maximized subject to D'.



## An Algorithm: Randomize Then Classify

Procedure:

- Fix a probability distribution X over the tasks.
- Choose a task T~ X
- Classify using a fair classifier for T.

Homework: Prove RTC is individually fair.


# Functional Composition

Relevant outcome: get in to at least one college.

**Definition**. A set of classifiers *C* for task T with metric *D* satisfy *OR-Fairness* if for all u, v in U  $|p_u - p_v| \le D(u,v)$ , where  $p_w$  is the probability that w is accepted by at least one classifier in *C*.

Theorem. For any nontrivial task, there exists a set of classifiers that are fair in isolation, but violate OR-Fairness.

**Proof Sketch:** Characterize when  $1-(1-p_u)^n$  grows faster than  $1-(1-p_v)^n$ .




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Theorem. For any nontrivial task, there exists a set of classifiers that are fair in isolation, but violate OR-Fairness.

**Observation**. If for all  $C_i$  and all u in U the probability of positive classification for u under  $C_i$  is above  $\frac{1}{2}$ , then fairness is preserved under OR-composition.




OR of "heavy" ORs

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
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### Dependent Compositions

In many cases outcomes are not independent:


- Can only accept *n* students
- Must accept at least n/2 students who can pay tuition
- Can't grant too many loans or hire too many people on a particular day


Two main settings:

- Cohort Selection (fixed size *n*)
- Universe Subset Problems: operate on subset, but still want fairness wrt all pairs



### Dependent Composition: Many Possible Axes...






### The Cohort Selection Problem


**Cohort Selection:** Given a universe of individuals U and an integer n < |U|, select n individuals from U such that for every u and v in U the difference in probability of selection  $p_u$  and  $p_v$  respectively satisfies  $D(u,v) \ge |p_u-p_v|$ .

Cannot independently classify each element, as the number of previously selected elements must be taken into account. Independent Classification: By applying a fair classifier C independently to each element, can select up to |U| elements.



#### **Cohort Selection:**

Must select n elements without increasing distances. Probability of selection dependent on other elements.




### Constrained Cohort Selection

**Definition.** For  $A \subseteq U$ ,  $p \in [0,1]$ , fairly select a set of n elements of U such that at least a p fraction of those selected are in A.

- Must have at least n/2 students who pay full tuition to cover operating costs
- Must satisfy statistical parity for legal reasons
- Must accept at least p\*n students of each gender who can play a particular sport to field a team

### An Impossibility Result (simple special case)



B is a blown-up version of A, and |A| = n/2=pn  $\forall u \in A: p_u = 1$   $\exists v \in B: p_v \le 1/k$ . Let  $u \in A$  satisfy D(u, v) = 0. QED.

### The Universe Subset (Cohort Selection) Problem

Let Y be a distribution over subsets of U. Let  $X = \{X(V)\}\}_{V \subseteq U}$  be family a distributions, where X(V) is a distribution on permutations of the elements of V. For a system  $S_n: \Pi(2^U) \times r \to U^*$ , Experiment $(S_n, X, Y, u)$ :

- 1. Choose r ~ {0,1}\*
- 2. Choose V ~ **Y**
- 3. Choose  $\pi \sim X(V)$
- 4. Run  $S_n$ , and output 1 if u is selected

The system is individually fair (and a solution to the Cohort Selection Problem) if  $\forall u, v \in U$ ,

```
|\mathbb{E}[\text{Experiment}(S_n, X, Y, u)] - \mathbb{E}[\text{Experiment}(S_n, X, Y, v)]| \le D(u, v)
```

(and  $S_n$  outputs a set of n distinct elements of U).

### Solutions for Basic, Offline Cohort Selection

**Easiest Setting:** decisions made offline, with access to the entire universe U and the metric D with no constraints on the output set other than size.

#### Permute then Classify

- 1. Choose  $\pi \sim S_{|U|}$ , where  $S_{|U|}$  is the set of all permutations of |U| elements
- 2. Apply  $\pi$  to U, and classify each element as usual until either:
  - n elements are selected: stop
  - there are exactly enough elements left in the permutation to select n total: take all remaining elements

### **Weighted Sampling**

- Enumerate all sets of size n, and for each set T assign weight w(T) ∝ ∑<sub>u ∈ T</sub> E[C(u)]
- 2. Sample from all of the sets with probability proportional to the weights

### Individual Fairness in Pipelines

- Hire a cohort; one year later, promote a cohort member to team leader
  - Whether or not you are promoted depends on the cohort
  - Not so crazy: hiring decisions not necessarily made by team's organizational head; hiring manager often different than manager one year later
- Gives rise to yet another catalog of evils

### Two-Stage Cohort Pipeline

- Universe U, Permissible set of cohorts  $C \subseteq Pow(U) \setminus \emptyset$
- Cohort selection mechanism  $A: U \rightarrow C$ , aka the "hiring manager"
- A set of scoring functions  $F: C \times U \rightarrow [0,1]$  and  $f \in F$ 
  - Scoring is contextual, i.e., may have  $f(c, u) \neq f(c', u)$
  - Undefined if  $u \notin C$
- The pipeline is  $A \circ f$
- $C_u$ : set of cohorts in C containing individual  $u \in U$
- Probability that A selects u is  $p(u) = \sum_{c \in C_u} \Pr[A(U) = c]$ 
  - <u>Assume</u> intra-cohort fairness  $\forall c \in C \forall u, v \in c | f(c, u) f(c, v) | \le d(u, v)$

### Informal, Deceptively Simple, Fairness Definition

For  $f \in F$ , the pipeline instantiated with f is individually fair with respect to similarity metric d and distribution metric  $D: \Delta(O_{\text{pipeline}}) \times \Delta(O_{\text{pipeline}}) \rightarrow [0,1]$  if  $\forall u, v \in U: D([f \circ A](u), [f \circ A](v)) \leq d(u, v).$ 

If the pipeline is individually fair wrt d, D for all  $f \in F$ , then it is robust to F.

The hitch: outcome space  $O_{\text{pipeline}} = [0,1] \cup \{\bot\}$ : *individuals drop out*, voluntarily or otherwise, from the pipeline.

## **Unconditional and Conditional Distributions** Starting point: $\xi_u \in \Delta(0_{\text{pipeline}})$ places probability 1 - p(u) on $\perp$ $\xi_u \in \Delta(0_{\text{pipeline}})$ places probability $\sum_{c \in C_u} \Pr[f(c, u) = s] P_A(c)$ on $s \in [0,1]$

Unconditional distribution: as above, but treat  $\perp$  as having score of 0 For  $s \in (0,1]$ : place probability  $\sum_{c \in C_u} \Pr[f(c,u) = s] P_A(c)$  on sFor s = 0: place probability  $1 - p(u) + \sum_{c \in C_u} \Pr[f(c,u) = 0] P_A(c)$ 

Conditional distribution: condition on positive p(u): For  $s \in [0,1]$  place probability  $\frac{\sum_{c \in C_u} \Pr[f(c,u)=s]P_A(c)}{p(u)}$  on s

### Is This Fair?

- d(u, v) = 0.1
- Under A,  $p(u) = p(v) \stackrel{\text{\tiny def}}{=} p^*$  but A never outputs a cohort containing both
- Constrain f for the unconditional distribution  $|p(u)f(u) p(v)f(v)| \le d(u, v)$ , Simplifies to  $p^*|f(u) - f(v)| \le d(u, v)$
- Weak fairness constraint when  $p^*$  is small!


Congratulations, you are offered a job! After a year you, may expect a promotion with probability f(u) (or, for v, f(v)).

Ulfar and Virginia receive offers with the same probability, but correctly perceive the offers very differently.




### Metric-Fair Affirmative Action

## Fair AA via Metrics (highly simlplified)




- Pair up S's and T's to minimize  $\sum_{i} d(s_i, t_{\text{pair}(S_i)})$
- Classify  $s_i$  by classifying  $t_{\text{pair}(s_i)}$

### Transforming One Distribution to Another




## Transforming One Distribution to Another

"Cost" (in clay-moving) captures difference between distributions



### The Earthmover Linear Program





## Transforming One Distribution to Another


Suppose 1/2 the clay on the right is pink...




## Transforming One Distribution to Another


### Then 1/2 the clay on the left is pink!








1.  $\forall y \in T, o \in O : L'(y, o) = \sum_{x \in S} \mu_x(y)L(x, o) + L(y, o)$  where  $\mu_x$  is from the EM+L mapping 2. Run the Fairness LP only on *T*, using *L*'






Given  $\{\mu_x\}_{x \in S}$  here and  $\{\nu_x\}_{x \in T}$  from Fairnes LP, define:  $M: V \to \Delta(0)$ :

$$M(x) = \begin{cases} \nu_x & x \in T \\ E_{y \sim \mu_x} \nu_y & x \in S \end{cases}$$


Minimizes loss AND disruption of  $S \times T$ Lipschitz requirement, subject to parity and the within-group Lipschitz constraints



Given  $\{\mu_x\}_{x\in S}$  here and  $\{\nu_x\}_{x\in T}$  from Fairnes LP, define:  $M: V \to \Delta(0)$ :

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
More flexibility still: can eliminate the reweighting, prohibiting expression of opinions on the fate of elements in *S*. May make sense if vendor has done no market research on *S* 



Given  $\{\mu_x\}_{x \in S}$  here and  $\{\nu_x\}_{x \in T}$  from Fairnes LP, define:  $M: V \to \Delta(0)$ :

$$M(x) = \begin{cases} \nu_x & x \in T \\ E_{y \sim \mu_x} \nu_y & x \in S \end{cases}$$

Compare to just adding statistical parity the Fairness LP, and eliminating the cross-group Lipschitz constraints: the approach here is more faithful to the  $S \times T$  distances, providing protection against the "self-fulfilling prophecy" evil in which one deliberately selects the "wrong" subset of *S* 




Given  $\{\mu_x\}_{x \in S}$  here and  $\{\nu_x\}_{x \in T}$  from Fairnes LP, define:  $M: V \to \Delta(0)$ :

$$M(x) = \begin{cases} \nu_x & x \in T \\ E_{y \sim \mu_x} \nu_y & x \in S \end{cases}$$

#### The metric is everything.

In this view, one can adjust the metric in such a way that the Lipschitz condition will imply statistical parity; makes sense if one believes that the metric does not fully reflect potential that may be undeveloped because of unequal access to resources. Reflected in the <u>ranking</u> approach discussed below.



Given  $\{\mu_x\}_{x\in S}$  here and  $\{\nu_x\}_{x\in T}$  from Fairnes LP, define:  $M: V \to \Delta(0)$ :

$$M(x) = \begin{cases} \nu_x & x \in T \\ E_{y \sim \mu_x} \nu_y & x \in S \end{cases}$$


Claim: M(x) satisfies

- (1) statistical parity between *S* and *T* up to bias  $\varepsilon$ ; and
- (2) the Lipschitz condition for every withingroup pair.

$$D_{TV}(M(S), M(T)) = D_{TV}(E_{x \in S}E_{y \sim \mu_x}v_y, E_{x \in T}v_x)$$
  
$$\leq D_{TV}(\mu_S, U_T) \leq \varepsilon$$

### Fair Affirmative Action via Metrics

- We know how to handle multiple disjoint groups / strata / ZIP+4s
  - O With a metric
- The intersectional case?



### Fair Affirmative Action via Rankings

- Example: Universities of Texas and California
  - O Top 10% of students in each high school class
- Example [John Roemer]:
  - O Stratify students according to education level of mother
  - O Rank students within each stratum by number of hours spent on homework per week
  - O Admit to university top k% from each stratum
- Example [Danielle Allen, "Talent is Everywhere"]
  - O Stratify students according to SAT/GPA and discard all below a fixed threshold
  - O Admit randomly so as to maximize geographic diversity

### Metric-Fair Affirmative Action

- We know how to handle multiple disjoint groups / strata / ZIP+4s
  - O With a metric
  - O Without a metric, from a "fair ranking"
- The intersectional case?
- Can address intersectionality via Evidence-Based Ranking
  - Hold that thought

