

UCLA

## Modeling human action understanding as inverse planning


Chris Baker, Josh Tenenbaum, Rebecca Saxe  
MIT

## Heider and Simmel demo

## Intuitive psychology


- How do we infer hidden mental states of other agents that cause their observed behavior?
  - Beliefs, desires, plans, intentions, emotions.
- How do we use mental-state inferences to learn about the world?
  - Pulling out into traffic, jumping off a summit...
- What is the structure of intuitive theories of psychology that support these inferences, and how are those theories acquired?

## Why did the man cross the street?



## Principle of rationality


- Intuitively, we assume other agents will tend to take sequences of actions that most effectively achieve their goals given their beliefs.
- More formally: *inverse planning* in a goal-based Markov Decision Process (MDP).




$$p(B, G | A) \propto p(A | B, G) p(B, G)$$

## Caution!

- We are not proposing this as a computational model of how people plan! It is a computational model of people's mental model of how people plan.
- Whether planning is "rational" or well-described as solving an MDP is an interesting but distinct question.



## Rational action understanding in infants (Gergely & Csibra)



## The present research

- Aims
  - To test how accurately and precisely the inverse planning framework can explain people's intuitive psychological judgments.
  - To use the inverse planning framework as a tool to test alternative accounts of people's intuitive theories of psychology.
- Experiments 1 & 2: goal inference
- Experiments 3 & 4: action prediction

## Experiment 1: goal inference

- Method
  - Subjects ( $N=16$ ) view animated trajectories in simple maze-like environments.
  - Subjects observe partial action sequences with several candidate goals and are asked to rate relative probabilities of goals at different points along each trajectory.




## Experiment 1: goal inference

- Method
  - Subjects ( $N=16$ ) view animated trajectories in simple maze-like environments.
  - Subjects observe partial action sequences with several candidate goals and are asked to rate relative probabilities of goals at different points along each trajectory.
- Set up
  - Cover story: intelligent aliens moving in their natural environment.
  - Assume fully observable world: agent's beliefs = true states and transition functions of the environment.
  - 100 total judgments, with 3-6 judgment points along each of 36 different trajectories (= 4 goal positions x 3 kinds of obstacles x 3 goals).

## Specific inverse planning models


- Model M1( $\beta$ ): fixed goal
  - The agent acts to achieve a particular state of the environment, which is fixed for a given action sequence.
  - Small negative cost for each step that does not reach the goal.




G: goal state  
 $S_t$ : environmental state at time  $t$   
 $A_t$ : action at time  $t$   
 $\beta$ : parameter controlling "noisiness" of actions



## Specific inverse planning models


- Model M2( $\beta, \gamma$ ): switching goals
  - Just like M1, but the agent's goal can change at any time step with probability  $\gamma$ .
  - Agent plans greedily, not anticipating its own potential goal changes.








- ### An alternative heuristic account?
- We can rule out most *very* simple heuristics
    - Infer the goal that is closest
    - Infer goal based on direction
  - What about more complex heuristics?
    - Last-step: infer goal based on *only* the last movement (instead of entire path)
    - Delta-D: infer goal based on the derivative of the distance from the goal with respect to time
    - Last-step and Delta-D heuristics yield similar, sometimes identical predictions

- ### An alternative heuristic account?
- Last-step heuristic: infer goal based on only the last movement (instead of the entire path)
    - a special case of M2, equivalent to  $M2(\beta, .67)$ .
  - This model correlates highly with people's judgments in Experiment 1.
  - However, there are qualitative differences between this model's predictions and people's judgments that suggest that people are using a more sophisticated form of temporal integration.





## Analysis with full data set



## Summary

- Inverse planning is a framework for inferring mental states from behavior, assuming a rational agent.
- Inverse planning can be used to predict people's goal attributions with high accuracy (at least in simple environments).
- Goal attributions are better explained by inverse planning with a dynamic space of goals than a simpler model with fixed goals or various "one-step" heuristics.
- Intuitive psychology appears to be based on a precise predictive model, much like intuitive physics.
- Intuitive psychology may be "more rational" than actual psychology....

## Open directions

- More complex environments.
- Hierarchical goal structures, plans.
- Richer mental-state representations, e.g. recursive belief: "I'm guessing that you think Mary is wrong, but trust me, she isn't."
  - Competitive interactions (e.g., Jun Zhang)
  - Language understanding
- The acquisition of intuitive psychology.
- The relation between psychology (how people actually think and plan) and intuitive psychology.