# Computational Challenges in Electric Power Markets











Richard P O'Neill Chief Economic Advisor FERC

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#### fictions, approximations, paradigm changes and politics

⇒300 BC: Aristotle's science ⇒Air, Water, Fire, Earth, Aether 'proved' voids impossible therefore no zero ⇒aether fills all potential voids ⇒Middle Ages: Roman Church adopts Aristotle ⇒Punished for contrary views Retards development of algebra in Europe ⇒aether gradually disappears ⇒Zero appears in Europe ⇒21<sup>st</sup> century recycling ⇒aether theory recycled as dark energy ⇒ Keeping zero







→ United States Gross Production (2009): ≈4,000 TWh At \$50/MWh: cost \$600 billion/year (world) ⇒ cost \$200B (billion) /year (US) At \$100/MWh: cost \$2,000 billion/year (world) ⇒ cost \$400B/year (US) In US 10% savings is about than \$20 to \$40B/yr All current ISO markets are constrained by software ;-( money can't buy you love

Source: IEA Electricity Information, 2010

#### 1960s

Edward Teller on 1965 Blackout: "power systems need sensors, communications, computers, displays and controls" Engineering judgment







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1990s

Open access (FERC Order 888)

ISOs form

Markets evolve

Efficiency objective Engineering judgment

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#### software

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# Market Design Intersection of Disciplines



- ⇒Institutions and Legacies
  - Federal commission: just and reasonable rates for wholesales and transmission
  - ⇒state commissions: eminent domain and rates for retail sales and distribution
  - ⇒ISOs Stakeholder process: voting rules and coalitions
- ⇒Game Theory
  - ⇒Non-cooperative game theory: no coalitions
- Cooperative game theory: non-cooperative with coalitions
  Electrical engineering and physics
- ⇒Ecoñomics: primary objective is market efficiency
- Optimization over complex algebra and binary variables

## Electrical engineering myths and shibboleths



⇒Physics of AC power (non-convex over complex algebra)
⇒ Traditional approximations and 'good utility practice'
⇒ Reliability rules imply economic values
⇒ VOLL is between \$4,000 and \$10,000/MWh
⇒ Misguided objectives:
⇒ Volt-Var optimization
⇒ Minimize losses

 $\Rightarrow$  Introduction of new technology is not the internet model.

Entry must run the gantlet of educational inertia, bureaucracy and lack of large-scale testing on real data

# Non-convex Auction Market Economics



⇒ primary objective is market efficiency (max market surplus) ⇒No 'single market-clearing price' ⇒Need multi-part pricing  $\Rightarrow$ Internalize externalities ⇒Market power needs mitigation (cost-based offers) ⇒ Secondary objective: good incentives and prices The distribution of benefits is a separate problem ⇒Non-confiscatory and revenue neutral ⇒Incentives for efficient bidding (more important)  $\Rightarrow$  Incentives for efficient investment (less important) ⇒Investment signals are noisy

# Bad Objectives, Public Goods and Equity

⇒Maximize surplus creates a largest benefits
 ⇒Equity: focused subsidies for needy
 ⇒Local public v private goods
 ⇒Declaring a private good ot be a public good is mischievous

⇒Bad objective: Maximize consumer surplus
⇒Is a steel producer more deserving that a solar facility
⇒What if the generator is owned by the Little Sisters of the Poor?
⇒Should we subsidize the heating of swimming pools?



# Practical Non-convex Optimization



The optimization on non-convex functions is not well understood

⇒Academic

⇒NP-hard arguments are only of theoretical concern
 ⇒Worst case bounds are of little value
 ⇒infinite convergence (10<sup>-8</sup>)
 ⇒Local optima

⇒ Practical
 ⇒ Data is noisy
 ⇒ Approximations are everywhere
 ⇒ Objective best solution in the time window
 ⇒ convergence tolerance of 10<sup>-3</sup> is good

# ISO Markets and Planning



#### ⇒ Four main ISO Auctions

- ⇒ Real-time: for efficient dispatch (every 5 minutes)
- ⇒ Day-ahead: for efficient unit scheduling (daily)
- Generation Capacity: to ensure generation adequacy and cover efficient recovery (annual)
- Transmission rights (FTRs): to hedge transmission congestion costs (annual)
- Planning and investment (annual)
  - Competition and cooperation
- All use approximations due to software limitations

# From real time dispatch to investment planning

#### Mixed Integer Nonconvex Proaram maximize c(x)subject to $g(x) \le 0$ , $Ax \le b$ $l \le x \le u$ , some $x \in \{0,1\}$ c(x), g(x) may be non-convex



I didn't know what I would find there



### Optimization Time Scales





## Market Approximation **Mixed Integer Linear Program**

maximize CX subject to Ax = b,  $| \leq x \leq u$ , some  $x \in \{0,1\}$ Better modeling for Start-up and shutdown Transmission switching Investment decisions solution times improved by > 10<sup>7</sup> in last 30 years 10 years becomes 10 minutes

And though the holes were rather small They had to count them all

It was twenty

THE NEXT GENERATION OF ELECTRIC POWER UNIT COMMITMENT MODELS

> Edited by Benjamin F. Hobbs Michael H. Rothkopf Richard P. O'Neill Hung-po Chao

#### Power Markets and MIP the early years Let me tell you how it will be



⇒Pre-1999, Mixed Integer Programs ⇒MIP can not solve in time window ⇒Lagrangian Relaxation leaves a duality gap ⇒solutions are usually infeasible ⇒Over simplifies generators; no transmission switching ⇒1999 Unit commitment conference and book ⇒Bixby demonstrates MIP improvements using CPLEX ⇒2005 PJM adopts MIP for market software ⇒2015 All ISOs have adopted MIP Annual Savings > \$2B

#### Mixed Integer Programs Development

Pre-2000 Aristotelian logic: better branch and bound
Improvements since 2000

⇒Presolve - numerous small ideas

⇒better linear program solvers: robust dual simplex

Variable/node selection and bound strengthening

⇒Cuts (planes, zero-half and path)

⇒covers (knapsack, flow and GUB),

⇒integer rounding, cliques, implied bounds,

⇒ Since 1988 CPLEX and GUROBI (10<sup>7</sup> seconds in a year)
 ⇒ 10<sup>7</sup> software improvement
 ⇒ 10<sup>4</sup> hardware improvement

#### 2010s

Promote efficient wholesale markets through the exploration of software and hardware that will optimize market operations

# software

# Engineering judgment

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2015



#### FERC focuses on prices, incentives and cost allocation for settlements mechanisms

software

Engineering judgment



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### New markets new technologies

⇒Wind, solar, batteries,
⇒flexible generators
⇒topology optimization
⇒price responsive demand
⇒Need flexibility
⇒Where is the peak?

⇒First contingency is weather.





www.seppo.net



# End-use markets got to get you into my life



⇒Consumers receive very weak price signals ⇒monthly meter; 'see' monthly average price  $\Rightarrow$  On a hot summer day ⇒Cost > \$1000/MWh ⇒price < \$100/MWh ⇒ results in market inefficiencies and ⇒ inefficient purchase decisions.  $\Rightarrow$  Smart meter and real-time price are key ⇒ Solution: smart appliances real time pricing, interval meters and ⇒ Demand-side bidding ⇒Result: Large two-sided market!!!!!!!!! 21

He's as blind as he can be just sees what he wants to see



# what we do well and what we are working on

What we do well
 Solve sparse linear equations
 Solve linear optimization problems
 Solve convex optimization problems

What is more difficult
 Problems with binary variables
 Startup, min run time,
 Optimality gap
 Problems with continuous non-convex functions
 Local optima
 Duality gap



**Distribution Factor Model** if  $z_i$  is fixed, SCED; if  $z_i$  is {0,1}, SCUC  $MS = \max \sum_{i \in D} b_i d_i - \sum_{i \in G} c_i p_i$ dual variables  $\sum_{i \in D} d_i - \sum_{i \in G} p_i + losses = 0$  A power bal  $d_i - d^{\max}_i \le 0$ i∈D a<sup>max</sup>; max demand i∈D a<sup>min</sup>; min demand  $-d_i \leq -d^{\min}$  $\mathbf{p}_i - \mathbf{z}_i \mathbf{p}^{\max}_i \leq \mathbf{0}$  $i \in G$   $\beta^{max}$ ; max supply  $-\mathbf{p}_i - \mathbf{z}_i \mathbf{p}^{\min}_i \leq \mathbf{0}$ i∈G B<sup>min</sup>, min supply  $\sum_{i} df_{ki}(p_i - d_i) - p_k = 0$  $k \in K = T_k$  flow balance  $k \in K$   $\mu^{max}_{k}$  flowgate max  $\mathbf{p}_k \leq \mathbf{p}^{\max}_k$ k∈K Dg3≥ O

# Day-ahead and Real-time Market Process



- 1. Formulate the distribution factor (DF) unit commitment
- 2. Solve the unit commitment (SCUC)
- 3. Solve the security constrained economic dispatch (SCED)
- 4. Check for AC reliability, e g, N-1-1, voltage limits
- 5. check for convergence, if so go to step 9
- 6. If not, create linear constraints for 'violations'
- 7. add constraints DF
- 8.  $g_{24}$  to 2 or 3
- 9. solve pricing run and post dispatch and prices

# binding constraints on market efficiency

⇒As

⇒computers get faster and cheaper ⇒software gets faster and better ⇒measurements get better, e g, PMUs ⇒information transfer gets faster ⇒ There is the potential significant market efficiency improvement ⇒binding constraints on market efficiency ⇒Software ⇒"Good Utility Practice"



### Improving the Approximation

- $\Rightarrow$  AC v DC (distribution factor or B $\theta$ )
- $\Rightarrow$  DF model is 10<sup>2</sup> to 10<sup>3</sup> faster than B $\theta$
- ⇒Better loss approximation
- ⇒Introduce reactive power linearization
  - ⇒RMR choices are weak
  - Cut sets are a very rough approximation
  - Introduce D-curve and transmission reactive
    approximation
  - Topology optimization improvement
    - Corrective switching
    - <sup>26</sup> Efficiency improving switching

#### Alternating Current Optima Power Flow (ACOPF)





### AC polar Non-convex network to "DC" linear

AC polar model  $p_{n} - \sum_{k} p_{knm} = 0$   $q_{n} - \sum_{k} q_{knm} = 0$   $p_{knm} = v_{n}v_{n}g^{s}_{k} + v_{n}v_{m}[g_{k}\cos(\theta_{nm}) + b_{k}\sin(\theta_{nm})]$   $q_{knm} = v_{n}v_{n}g^{s}_{k} + v_{n}v_{m}[g_{k}\sin(\theta_{nm}) - b_{k}\cos(\theta_{nm})]$ 







⇒Includes reactive power, voltage constraints
⇒Standard nonlinear solvers are faster
Optimization results can be formulation dependent
⇒IV approximation is linear in the network equation
⇒Rectangular formulations solve faster
⇒Simple linear equations for state estimator
⇒Convex and linear approximations
⇒ARPA-E initiative to perform better testing

### **Operator Intervention**



⇒reactive power is it too cheap to meter?
⇒N-1-1 reliability

- In load pockets, either operator dispatch or cut set constraints are needed
- Causes generators to start up and sit at minimum operating level to produce reactive power
- Cost of reactive power is the startup, no-load, minimum operating level, and min runtime costs
- $\Rightarrow$  Also suppresses the LMP  $_{30}$

#### Polar PQ formulation Carpentier 's 1962 formulation

Min c(p, q)

 $p_{n} = \sum_{mk} v_{n}v_{m}(g_{nmk}cos\theta_{nm} + b_{nmk}sin\theta_{nm})$   $q_{n} = \sum_{mk} v_{n}v_{m}(g_{nmk}sin\theta_{nm} - b_{nmk}cos\theta_{nm})$   $p^{min}{}_{n} \leq p_{n} \leq p^{max}{}_{n}$   $q^{min}{}_{n} \leq q_{n} \leq q^{max}{}_{n}$   $v^{min}{}_{n} \leq v_{n} \leq v^{max}{}_{n}$   $\theta^{min}{}_{nm} \leq \theta_{n} - \theta_{m} \leq \theta^{max}{}_{nm}.$ n, m are bus indices

Network equations are quadratic and trigonometric Bus equations linear



# Rectangular Network Equations

IV network equations are linear: I = YV  $i_n = \sum_{m \in N} g_{nm} v_m^r - \sum_{m \in N} b_{nm} v_m^j$  $i_n = \sum_{m \in N} b_{nm} v_m^r + \sum_{m \in N} g_{nm} v_m^j$ 

P, Q equations in rectangular form are quadratic:  $S = I \cdot V = YV \cdot V$ 



#### **Rectangular ACOPF-IV Formulation**

Network-wide objective function: Min c(P, Q) Network-wide constraint: I = YV at each bus non-convex bilinear constraints  $v^{r}i^{r} + v^{j}i^{j} \leq p^{max}$  $p^{\min} \leq v^r i^r + v^j i^j$ vji<sup>r</sup> - v<sup>r</sup>ij ≤ g<sup>max</sup>  $q^{\min} \leq v^{j} i^{r} - v^{r} i^{j}$  $(v^{min})^2 \leq v^r v^r + v^j v^j$  Optimization drives voltage higher Convex bilinear constraints  $v^{r}v^{r} + v^{j}v^{j} \leq (v^{max})^{2}$  $(i^{r})^{2}$ + $(i^{j})^{2} \leq (i^{max})$ 

 $(v_{m}^{r})^{2} + (v_{m}^{j})^{2} \leq (v_{m}^{max})^{2}$ 



#### **Convex Constraints**

If the constraint is convex, preprocessed cuts

Add iterative tight cuts cutting off previous LP optimum For each node, add a tight linear constraint:

 $\underline{v}^{r}v^{r} + \underline{v}^{j}v^{j} \leq (v^{max})^{2}$ 

cuts off the linear program solution, is tangent to and contains to convex constraint



#### Real and Reactive Power Conversions.

We can linearize around  $\underline{v}_{n}^{r}, \underline{v}_{n}^{j}, \underline{i}_{n}^{r}, \underline{i}_{n}^{j}$  $p^{\approx} = \underline{v}_{n}^{r} \underline{i}_{n}^{r} + \underline{v}_{n}^{j} \underline{i}_{n}^{j} + v_{n}^{r} \underline{i}_{n}^{r} + v_{n}^{j} \underline{i}_{n}^{j} - (\underline{v}_{n}^{r} \underline{i}_{n}^{r} + \underline{v}_{n}^{j} \underline{i}_{n}^{j})$   $q^{\approx} = \underline{v}_{n}^{j} \underline{i}_{n}^{r} - \underline{v}_{n}^{r} \underline{i}_{n}^{j} - v_{n}^{r} \underline{i}_{n}^{j} + v_{n}^{j} \underline{i}_{n}^{r} - (\underline{v}_{n}^{j} \underline{i}_{n}^{r} - \underline{v}_{n}^{r} \underline{i}_{n}^{j})$ 

We add step-size constraints:  $p^{\min} \leq p^{\approx} \leq p^{\max}$   $q^{\min} \leq q^{\approx} \leq q^{\max}$ and drop the previous approximation

Computational experience IV SLP faster than most commercial non-linear solvers best parameters are problem-dependent

#### **ACOPF Using Semi-definitive Programs**

⇒Javad Lavaei et al received the INFORMS Optimization Society Prize ⇒Convex approximation ⇒Global optimal solutions For ⇒standard test problems Networks with enough Phase Shifters ⇒Acyclic networks with positive LMPs Penalized reactive power on 'problematic' lines ⇒SDP algorithms are getting faster

# distribution optimization



⇒Decentralized markets ⇒ Distribution systems generally are trees and simple cycle networks ⇒Smart grids and markets  $\Rightarrow$ Losses can be high, e.g., 30% ⇒Reconfiguration switching ⇒Locating new assets ⇒Lowering losses lowers prices on the entire line



#### Optimal Transmission Switching







Optimal Transmission Switching DC Formulation

⇒ Fisher et al IEEE 118 bus model 25% savings found.

- ⇒ Hedman et al
  - ⇒ ISONE 5000 bus model 13% savings
- ⇒ N-1 reliability constraints
- $\Rightarrow$  Hedman et al
  - ⇒ IEEE 118 Bus Model 16% savings
  - ⇒ IEEE 73 (RTS 96) Bus Model 8% savings



# Beneficial transmission switching



⇒2015 Ruiz et al limited to 6 opens and 6 closes per hour
 ⇒savings of about \$100 million in RT and
 ⇒\$150 million in DA. 96% of savings with fast heuristic

⇒ 2015 Hedman et al corrective switching eliminates post-contingency violations
⇒ In PJM, eliminates post-contingency violations ~70%
⇒ Estimated savings: \$100M/year
⇒ Ostrowski et al (RTS96) anti-islanding > 10x
⇒ In 5 years solutions are 100 times faster
⇒ Now considered part of the smart grid
⇒ Still potential for improvements
⇒ Fuller AC v. DC switching

# Coptimal Toppogy



problem	current	next decade
Corrective switching	little	Real-time
Topology estimator		
Real-time market	Pre-studied	Real-time
day-ahead market	Pre-studied	Day ahead
Maintenance scheduling	none	monthly
Optimal planning	none	annual

#### AC IV Transmission Switching

Transmission flow equations

$$i^{r}_{nmk} - g_{nmk}(v^{r}_{n} - v^{r}_{m}) + b_{nmk}(v^{j}_{n} - v^{j}_{m}) = 0$$
  

$$i^{j}_{nmk} - b_{nmk}(v^{r}_{n} - v^{r}_{m}) - g_{nmk}(v^{j}_{n} - v^{j}_{m}) = 0$$
  

$$(i^{r}_{nmk})^{2} + (i^{j}_{nmk})^{2} \leq (i^{max}_{nmk})^{2}$$

Transmission switching equations:  $z_k = 0$  (out);  $z_k = 1$  (in)

$$\begin{split} & i^{r}_{nmk} - g_{nmk}(v^{r}_{n} - v^{r}_{m}) + b_{nmk}(v^{j}_{n} - v^{j}_{m}) \leq M(1 - z_{k}) \\ & i^{r}_{nmk} - g_{nmk}(v^{r}_{n} - v^{r}_{m}) + b_{nmk}(v^{j}_{n} - v^{j}_{m}) \geq -M(1 - z_{k}) \\ & i^{j}_{nmk} - b_{nmk}(v^{r}_{n} - v^{r}_{m}) - g_{nmk}(v^{j}_{n} - v^{j}_{m}) \leq M(1 - z_{k}) \\ & i^{j}_{nmk} - b_{nmk}(v^{r}_{n} - v^{r}_{m}) - g_{nmk}(v^{j}_{n} - v^{j}_{m}) \geq -M(1 - z_{k}) \\ & (i^{r}_{nmk})^{2} + (i^{j}_{nmk})^{2} \leq z_{k}(i^{max}_{nmk})^{2} \end{split}$$



# Modeling For Long-term Planning

⇒Epistemology: what do we know about the future?
⇒Representation of uncertainty
⇒Weather (wind, solar, temperature)
⇒interactions
⇒Generator failure is a function of
⇒Weather
⇒Maintenance

#### Modeling for long-term planning

- transmission expansion
- ⇒Reduced network
- No binaries, eg, unit commitment result less flexible generators (CTs)
- ⇒Ramping issues
- ⇒Price-responsive demand
- ⇒Representative time periods
  - ⇒Peak only
  - ⇒Peak, off peak
  - ⇒Representative weeks
  - ⇒Seasons (summer, fall, winter, spring)
- ⇒Scenarios



Periods

#### stochastic issues

⇔Old

- ⇒Forced outage model of generation
- ⇒Estimating tomorrow's demand with temperature forecast ⇒Estimating long term demand with GPD forecast

⇒New

⇒Ramp rate model of generation ⇒Weather forecasts ⇒temperature ⇒wind ⇒cloud cover

#### 2020

better software and hardware better software

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#### 2030



# software

better software and hardware

⇒ Unit commitment for demand
 ACOPF
 ⇒ Distribution systems
 optimization

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# Computational Research Questions



⇒ Decomposition and Grid (parallel) computing
 ∞ Real/reactive
 ∞ Time
 ∞ Time
 ∞ Time

 $\boldsymbol{\varnothing}$  convex

⇒ Avoiding local optima

⇒ Nonlinear prices

⇒ Better tree trimming

⇒ Better cuts

⇒ Advance starting points

If you really like it you can have the rights It could make a million for you overnight



#### References at

http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/market-planning/opf-papers.asp