



Large-scale Multi-agent Simulation for Studying Detection, Tracking and Prediction of Threats

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
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IPAM Crime Hot Spots
2 February 2007



Outline

- **The Hats Simulator**
- **Asymmetric Threat Assessment Tool (ATAT)**



Evaluation: Using simulation as a virtual world in which you know ground truth

and can evaluate technology intended to uncover that truth

Explanation: A model that tells us why something happened - identifies laws

Prediction: Helps determine what will happen

Explanation \neq Prediction!

Evaluation is how we have used Hats

ATAT is aimed at prediction

The Hats Simulator

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The Hats Problem Domain


- a “society in a box”
- requires little domain knowledge
- huge amount of temporal data (data feed, events over time)
- very low signal-to-noise ratio
- requires generating and managing huge number of hypotheses

**Find terrorist task forces in the Hats simulator
before they can do harm**

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The Hats Simulator



The Hats architecture

Hats: Rules of the Game - Entities

- **Known terrorists, covert terrorists, benign hats**
Terrorist Benign
"Terrorist" hats "Unknown" hats ← What we see
- All hats belong to two or more *organizations*
- Hats have *attributes* (capabilities), attributes are transferable at meetings
- *Beacons* also have attributes (vulnerabilities)

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Very simple domain ontology

Modeling organization membership: a kind of mixture model

Hats: Rules of the Game - Meetings

- **Tasks:** Bring a group of hats with selected attributes to a location for a meeting
- **Meetings:** Achieve tasks by getting the right hats with the right attributes to the target location.
- **Trades:** Hats trade attributes at meetings.
- **Attacks:** A meeting of terrorists at a beacon of where the terrorists have attributes matching the vulnerabilities of the beacon

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Model as task-driven (planned) behavior because we are interested in identifying INTENTION

Intention represents motivation and intended outcome.

Hats: Rules of the Game - Metrics, Scores

- An **information broker** provides information about hats over time, at a cost (more you pay, better quality info)
- **Scoring:**
 - Amount paid for information
 - False positives: accusing benign hats
 - Misses: losing a beacon
- The goal of the game is to minimize one's costs


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Cost: the RESOURCE MANAGEMENT problem associated with information gathering and QUALITY

Player Actions

- **Pay for information**
- **Arrest Hats**
 - Successful if
 - (a) hat is a terrorist
 - (b) hat is currently part of terrorist task force
 - Else, *false arrest*
- **Raise beacon Alert Level**




A quick walk-through of planner behavior


Schematic depiction of two organizations

NOTE: size of “ovals” does not indicate relative sizes of organizations

Hats may be members of multiple organizations (organizations overlap)




Planner selects task force out of available hats




Planner selects target beacon


Capabilities must match beacon vulnerabilities; task force may not already carry required capabilities




Planner plans series of meetings between hats



Capabilities are traded in meetings




Eventually task force hats have all required capabilities



Terrorist task force converges on beacon and attacks

Example Meeting Trees (Planned Tasks)




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Player Hypotheses

- Information Fusion
- Kinds of hypotheses
- Different time scales
- Relations between Hypotheses




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Kinds of hypotheses analyst must keep track of.

Bold black ovals represent information we can directly query (from the information broker)

The bold red Beacon-Threatened? oval represents the hypothesis we are generally most interested in

100,000 Hats



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
Snapshot of 100,000 hats

The purpose of this slide is to emphasize the large quantity of available data: all of these entities updating at each tick


Green boxes are beacons.

Clearly can't be solved by simple visual inspection.

Total Number of Meetings



Number of Terrorist Meetings



Example Simulation Stats:

100,000 Hats, 1000 Ticks

Population: 100,022 benign
 216 covert terrorists
 30 known terrorists
 = 100,268 total
 4000 Organizations
 1000 ticks: 00d:10h:27m:06s:624ms (40 seconds per tick)
 100K population: 00d:00h:03m:17s:423ms
 74,060 meetings
 Meeting Graph: **100,268 vertices and 7,312,974 edges**

500,000 Hats, 500 Ticks

Population: 500,013 benign
 204 covert terrorists
 30 known terrorists
 = 500,247 total
 20,000 Organizations
 500 ticks: 02d:13h:21m:08s:665ms (7.5 minutes per tick)
 500K population: 00d:00h:26m:00s:196ms
 168,666 meetings
 Meeting Graph: **500,247 vertices and 27,997,531 edges**


Implementation

- **Hats Code Base**
 - Runs on both commercial and open source lisp implementations
Macintosh Common Lisp and Franz Allegro (both commercial), and
OpenMCL and SBCL (both open source)
- **Performance**
 - Hats runs a scenario of 100,000 hats for 1000 ticks within a day
(roughly 3 ticks/sec without the IB, 2 ticks/sec with the IB)
- **Data Export**
 - to EAGLE Database (EDB) schema; also export in comma separated
value (CSV) and Lisp format


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Summary of Implementation and performance



Approach we're exploring for tracking threats in Hats.




Prior work on Capture the Flag war-game simulator:

<http://www-eksl.cs.umass.edu/research/ctf/>

Simulation permits Monte Carlo simulation runs, re-running the simulation while varying the initial conditions.

This uncovers the likelihood of possible ways the scenario might unfold (depends on variables measured)



This slide shows an example of what we can learn from Monte Carlo simulation trials. The trajectories represent MNTA (“mass near the action” -- how much of blue-force’s mass is near the “center” of the action) for 100 Monte Carlo trials (for a scenario like the one picture on the left in the previous slide). Trajectories are colored red if Red forces captured the flag in the south-west corner, blue if the Red forces were disabled by Blue, and green if time expired. MNTA is shown on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis. Clearly, Blue won most of the trials. In general, trials begin with Blue MNTA increasing to a maximum value at around time 100, then dropping off as Red and Blue units are destroyed or disabled.

Asymmetric Threat Assessment Tool (ATAT)

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Planning for Effects Based Operations


- **Requires understanding not just immediate effects – bomb damage and casualties – but also the non-immediate, secondary effects.**
- **This is difficult because secondary effects involve interactions of multiple factors, multiple pathways: along all aspects of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) scales.**
- **Our solution to understand PMESII effects is to use an agent based society simulation**

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Explicitly model interacting casual chains including both physical and psychological levels.

Dynamic graph of inter-related flows of information & materials, between agents & resources.



Political (government activity, propaganda, law)

Military (resource acquisition and control)

Economic (commerce, taxation, jobs)

Social (schools, religious institutions, entertainment)

Infrastructure (electricity, food, roads, hospitals)


Information (news, gossip, family links, friends, co-workers)

SMEs have model of first order and higher relationships and be able to specify these abstractly

The toolkit is template based so SMEs will generate new templates and fill in existing ones.

Templates cover the entire PMESII spectrum, so SMEs as a group will need to understand these interrelationships.

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The networks overlap and produce first and second order effects

The networks are also dynamic:


resources are created and destroyed;

agents make and break links between resources and between other

agents;

information alters the behavior and attributes of the agents.

The response of an agent embedded in such a network will depend on their initial inclinations, the inclinations of their peers, their social role and so on. Understanding such an agent and how an action will alter its behavior is far from trivial



2-dimensional world with population centers, abstract factories and agents

Population centers and factories are connected by links over which materials move.

Each agent has a home in a population center.

Factories consume and produce materials and resources that move over links.

Agents work at factories.

(Materials and supply are not explicitly modeled in the ATAT prototype.)


Agents may also belong to numerous groups, of which there are many types:

social, family, ethnic, religious and so on.

Agents have dispositions towards other agents based on their group memberships.

Agents also have propensities towards action and attributes describing their state (happiness, welfare, and so on).

Dispositions, propensities and attribute values all change as the simulator runs.



During a simulation run, the player takes actions such as
 degrading a factory,
 attacking a militia group, or
 building a new population center.


These actions produce events in the simulation.

Agents who directly experience events have strong reactions to them.

Agents who experience events indirectly have weaker reactions.

Opportunities, Actions and Effects

- **Agents are continually meeting.**
- **Meetings transmit changes in DPA from one agent to another.**
- **Meeting between members of a group ensure that the DPA of a group's members are synchronized to some extent.**



(DPA = Disposition and Propensity for Action)

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An agent's reaction depends on many factors:

the kind of event, the perpetrator, the agent's disposition towards the perpetrator and so forth.

All reactions perturb an agent's dispositions, propensities and attributes (DPA).

Transmission depends on

the two agent's disposition towards one another and on other agent attributes like welfare, leadership, and initiative.

Events also produce opportunities:

e.g., a troop movement event produces the opportunity to attack the troops as they move.

Opportunities provide groups with the *chance* to act.

Groups will act if their propensities towards action are high enough.

A group's action may produce another event that will then produce more opportunities and possibly more reactions.

Action / opportunity / reaction cycle

Agents witness events directly or hear about them indirectly

Witnessing events leads to changes in agent DPA.


- **Analyst abstracts and describes scenario:**
 - Population sub-groups, allegiances, resource needs and goals.
 - Resource facilities and linkages
 - Military capabilities and limitations
- **Simulator generates networks based on these parameters and starts simulation**
- **Simulator tracks changes in population moods, resource fluctuations, and information flow;**
 - Analyst takes actions to guide flows towards desired PMESII effects
 - E.g., reducing meeting rates, arresting terrorists, creating new resources
 - Due to information failures and terrorist activity, these actions may fail and the situation must be steered dynamically

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Simulation Tuning

ATAT can tune insurgent reactivity from the global level all the way down to the individual. The next three slides illustrate how a global tuner can be used to evaluate optimistic, pessimistic and expected hypotheses.




Insurgent and relevant events have been scripted into the ATAT and the system has been simulated to day 25.

Yellow circles represent the events described in the InSums.

Red circles represent insurgent events created by our simulator. They show areas where agents with propensities for insurgent behaviors are known to act and have significant probabilities of doing so.

Of note on the initial assessment given the ATAT's initial models:

- insurgent behavior by CNM and SBM militias in Alturas
- terrorist behavior in Susanville
- increasing civilian unrest in Medford (indicated by the shaded red circle about Medford on the map)




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


COA 1 - Economic Relief ATAT Evaluation

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
The next three slides demonstrate evaluation of a planned course of action (COA) involving simulated economic relief.



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
Initial state before COA commences



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Worst case scenario (no economic package/humanitarian aid). Economic situation continues to deteriorate and insurgent activity is more widespread. More importantly, behaviors are less localized (to Alturas and Bend).



Assumption is that coalition offers economic/humanitarian relief to Californian civilian population improving overall welfare state. Incidence of insurgent behavior is mitigated somewhat in CA, though conditions along the OR border, and into OR, are relatively unchanged.

ATAT Summary

- **The ATAT is a tool for modeling effects beyond bomb damage assessment (BDA) and body counts because it:**
 - **Provides an abstract model of malicious activity as a dynamic process where coalition and insurgent actions are interpreted subjectively by the agent population.**
 - **Enables “what-if” analysis of situation dependent actions and re-actions**
 - **Models the terrorist adversary as an enemy that can take direct and indirect actions.**
- **Aids in training for non-linear effects, unexpected consequences, and cross spectrum PMESII reasoning.**

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END

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