

# Safety-Critical Control of Autonomous Systems

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*Control and Dynamical Systems*

*California Institute of Technology*

*IPAM Workshop*

*Safe Operation of Connected and  
Autonomous Vehicle Fleets*

*October 25<sup>th</sup>, 2020*

**Caltech**





**Students & Post-Docs**




**Prithvi Akella**



**Eric Ambrose**



**Rachel Gehlhar**



**Thomas Gurriet**




**Claudia Kann**



**Wenlong Ma**



**Jenna Reher**




**Drew Singletary**



**Andrew Taylor**



**Maegan Tucker**



**Xiaobin Xiong**



**Reza Ahmadi**



**Yuxiao Chen**



**Ugo Rosolia**

**Collaborators  
(Partial List)**



**Ruzena Bajcsy  
Berkeley**




**Joel Burdick  
Caltech**



**Magnus Egerstedt  
Georgia Tech**



**Jessy Grizzle  
UMich**




**Paulo Tabuada  
UCLA**




**Yisong Yue  
Caltech**



**Autonomy in the real world is hard**



**But: Pretty when it works...**






**Question:** How do we make safety guarantees?





# Autonomy: The Big Picture





## Specifications

Tasks: "do things"




Invariance: "avoid things"

## System components

High-level control

Low-level control


## Design models



$$\frac{d}{dt} \mathbf{x} = f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u})$$

**Discrete**

**Continuous**




**Plant**



### Control barrier functions



$$\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$$

$\Updownarrow$   
 $\mathcal{C}$  is safe



### Control Lyapunov Functions $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$

$\Updownarrow$   
stability





# Control Lyapunov Functions

*Lyapunov (1892)*

PROBLÈME GÉNÉRAL

DE

LA STABILITÉ DU MOUVEMENT,

PAR M. A. LIAPOUNOFF.

*Sontag (1989)*

Systems & Control Letters 13 (1989) 117-123  
North-Holland

117

A 'universal' construction of Artstein's theorem  
on nonlinear stabilization

Eduardo D. SONTAG \*


Department of Mathematics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick,  
NJ 08903, U.S.A.

Received 7 March 1989

so that

$$\inf_{u \in \mathbb{R}^m} \{ L_f V(x) + u_1 L_{g_1} V(x) + \dots + u_m L_{g_m} V(x) \} < 0 \quad (2)$$

Control Lyapunov Functions  $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$



- Dynamics: For  $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$  and  $u \in \mathbb{R}^m$ :

$$\dot{x} = f(x) + g(x)u$$

- Lyapunov:  $V : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$  satisfying:

$$c_1 \|x\|^2 \leq V(x) \leq c_2 \|x\|^2$$

$$\inf_{u \in U} \dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$$

- Main idea:

$$\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x) \Rightarrow V(x(t)) \leq e^{-\alpha t} V(x(0))$$





PROBLÈME GÉNÉRAL

Lyapunov Controller

LA STABILITÉ DU MOUVEMENT,

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{des}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$

PAR M. A. LIAPOUNOFF.

Control Lyapunov Functions  $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$

- Affine Dynamics:  $\dot{x} = f(x) + g(x)u$
- Affine Constraint: The input  $u$  is affine in  $\dot{V}$ :

$$\dot{V}(x, u) = \frac{\partial V}{\partial x} f(x, z) + \frac{\partial V}{\partial x} g(x, z) u \leq -\alpha V(x)$$

- Synthesis: Closed form Controller:

$$m(x) = \begin{cases} -\frac{L_g V(x)^T (L_f V(x) + \alpha(V(x)))}{L_g V(x) L_g V(x)^T} & \text{if } L_f V(x) > -\alpha(V(x)) \\ 0 & \text{if } L_f V(x) \leq -\alpha(V(x)) \end{cases}$$

- Dynamics: For  $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$  and  $u \in \mathbb{R}^m$ :

$$\dot{x} = f(x) + g(x)u$$

- Lyapunov:  $V : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$  satisfying:

$$c_1 \|x\|^2 \leq V(x) \leq c_2 \|x\|^2$$

$$\inf_{u \in U} \dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$$

- Main idea:

$$\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x) \Rightarrow V(x(t)) \leq e^{-\alpha t} V(x(0))$$

Theorem

If there exists control Lyapunov function:

$$\inf_{u \in U} [\dot{V}(x, u) + \alpha V(x)] \leq 0$$

then for all feedback controllers:

$$u(x) \in \{u \in U : \dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)\}$$

$$\Downarrow \dot{x} = f(x) + g(x)u(x)$$

$x \rightarrow 0$  Exponentially.

# Human-Like Walking

## Lyapunov Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u,\delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$

+ Theorem  $\Rightarrow$  Stable Walking



# Application to Exoskeletons

First dynamic walking (without crutches) for paraplegics

Lyapunov Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u,\delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$

+ Theorem  $\Rightarrow$  Stable Walking

WANDERCRAFT  
ORDINARY LIFE FOR EXTRAORDINARY PEOPLE



Caltech




# Rapid Gait Generation on Quadrupeds

Lyapunov Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u,\delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$

+ Theorem  $\Rightarrow$  Stable Walking





# Application to Quadrupeds


## Lyapunov Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u,\delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$
$$\text{s.t. } \dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$$

+ Theorem  $\Rightarrow$  Stable Walking







### Lyapunov Controller


$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u,\delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$$

Rough Terrain Walking

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AMBER LAB Caltech



Simulation vs. Reality


Caltech

+ Theorem  $\Rightarrow$  Stable Walking




Flat Ground Outdoor Walking

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Lab Experiments

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Invariance  
"avoid things"

Low-level control

$$\frac{d}{dt} \mathbf{x} = f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u})$$

Plant




# Safety-Critical Walking



### Control barrier functions


$$\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$$

$\Updownarrow$   
 $\mathcal{C}$  is safe



### Control Lyapunov Functions $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$

$\Updownarrow$   
stability



Invariance  
"avoid things"

Low-level  
control

$$\frac{d}{dt} \mathbf{x} = f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u})$$

Plant






## Control barrier functions


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



## Control Lyapunov Functions $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$

$\Updownarrow$   
 stability



Embedding



Safety-Critical Control

$\Rightarrow$

Need something more general than Lyapunov



### Nagumo (1942)

*Über die Lage der Integralkurven gewöhnlicher Differentialgleichungen.*

Von Mitio Nagumo.

(Geliefert am 16. Mai 1942.)

#### §1. Einleitung.

In dieser Note werden  $k$ -dimensionale Vektoren mit dicken Buchstaben bezeichnet. Wir sollen also unter

### Prajna (2004) & Wieland (2007)


Safety Verification of Hybrid Systems Using Barrier Certificates

Stephen Prajna<sup>1</sup> and Ali Jadbabaie<sup>2</sup>


<sup>1</sup> Control and Dynamical Systems, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 - USA, prajna@cds.caltech.edu

<sup>2</sup> Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104 - USA, jadbabai@seas.upenn.edu

## Control barrier functions



Ames, Tabuada, Grizzle (2014)



AA, Tabuada Grizzle, CDC 2014

AA, Xu, Tabuada Grizzle, TAC 2017

## Control Barrier Functions

Provide necessary and sufficient conditions for set invariance, i.e., safety – *on the entire safe set*

- **Dynamics:**  $\dot{x} = f(x) + g(x)u$
- **Safe set  $C$ :** defined by  $h$ :

$$C = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : h(x) \geq 0\}$$

## Control Barrier Function

For all  $x \in C$ , there exists  $u \in \mathbb{R}^m$  such that:

$$\dot{h}(x, u) = \frac{\partial h}{\partial x}(x)(f(x) + g(x)u) \geq -\gamma(h(x))$$



$C$  is safe

Here  $\gamma : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is an extended class  $\mathcal{K}$  function (strictly increasing with  $\gamma(0) = 0$ ).



## Control barrier functions

$$\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$$

**Synthesis:** Let:

$$\varphi(x) \triangleq L_f h(x) + L_g h(x) u_{\text{des}}(x) + \alpha(h(x))$$

Closed form controller:

$$u^*(x) = u_{\text{des}}(x) - \begin{cases} \frac{\varphi(x) L_g h(x)^T}{L_g h(x) L_g h(x)^T} & \text{if } \varphi(x) < 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } \varphi(x) \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

Existing (desired) controller

### Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$

Safety (barrier function) constraint

## Safety Filters

Filter a given control input to guarantee safety:



- **Safe set  $\mathcal{C}$ :** defined by  $h$ :

$$\mathcal{C} = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : h(x) \geq 0\}$$

## Control Barrier Function

For all  $x \in \mathcal{C}$ , there exists  $u \in \mathbb{R}^m$  such that:

$$\dot{h}(x, u) = \frac{\partial h}{\partial x}(x)(f(x) + g(x)u) \geq -\gamma(h(x))$$

$\mathcal{C}$  is safe

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Closed form controller:

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Existing (desired) controller

## Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$


s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$

- AA, Tabuada Grizzle, CDC 2014
- AA, Xu, Tabuada Grizzle, TAC 2017


## Safety Filters

Filter a given control input to guarantee safety.

## No Control Barrier function $\Rightarrow$ Unsafe



## With Control Barrier function $\Rightarrow$ Safe



Safety (barrier function) constraint




## Control barrier functions


$$\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$$



$\mathcal{C}$  is safe




Embedding



## Control Lyapunov Functions $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$



stability



## Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$$

### Fundamental Properties:

**Lemma.** Control barrier functions imply stability of the set  $\mathcal{C}$ .

**Control Barrier Function  $h$ :** Yields a Lyapunov function for  $\mathcal{C}$ :

$$V_{\mathcal{C}}(x) \triangleq \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x \in \mathcal{C} \\ -h(x) & \text{if } x \in \bar{\mathcal{C}} = \mathbb{R}^n - \mathcal{C} \end{cases}$$

### Theorem


Lyapunov is the special case of barriers for  $\mathcal{C} = \{0\}$ .

# APPLICATIONS

Caltech



Walking Robots



Multi-Robot Systems



Automotive Systems



Collision Avoidance

## Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$


*Joint with: Egersted (GaTech), Tabuada (UCLA), Grizzle (UMich), Feron (GaTech), Xu (UW), Wandercraft, Hutter (ETH), Orosz (UMich)*



# Application to Automotive Systems


## Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC)

- Safety Constraints: “half the speedometer” following rule
- Control Objectives: Achieve a desired speed.



## Lane Keeping

- Safety Constraints: Stay in the lane for all time
- Control Objectives: Achieve reference signal





## Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u,\delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$$

Existing (desired) controllers

Safety (Barrier function) constraint



# Lane Keeping



Human =  $u_{des}$

Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{des}(x)\|^2$$


s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$

Car

Lane =  $h(x)$



# Adaptive Cruise Control




## Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \underset{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \quad \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$

# Multi-Robot Systems





# Multi-Robot Systems

Human =  $u_{des}$

Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \underset{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \|u - u_{des}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$

Spinning Faster...

# Obstacle Avoidance

Go to waypoint =  $u_{des}$

Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u,\delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{des}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{h}(x,u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$

$h(x) \geq 0$   
Safe Set



# Control Barrier Functions



# Artificial Potential Fields



**Theorem**  
*Control Barrier Functions include Artificial Potential Fields as a special case.*



## Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \underset{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$

$$u_{\text{des}}(x) = \nabla U_{\text{att}}(x)$$

$$h(x) = \frac{1}{1 + U_{\text{rep}}(x)} - \delta$$

**Repulsive Potential**  $U_{\text{rep}}(x)$ : Blows up at obstacle:

$$U_{\text{rep}}(x) \rightarrow \infty \quad \text{as} \quad \|x - x_{\text{obst}}\| \rightarrow D_{\text{obst}}$$

**Attractive Potential**  $U_{\text{att}}(x)$ : Positive definite about the goal:

$$\underline{c}\|x - x_{\text{goal}}\|^2 \leq U_{\text{att}}(x) \leq \bar{c}\|x - x_{\text{goal}}\|^2$$

**Artificial Potential:**  $U(x) = U_{\text{rep}}(x) + U_{\text{att}}(x)$ : Yields:

$$u(x) = \nabla U(x) = \nabla U_{\text{rep}}(x) + \nabla U_{\text{att}}(x)$$



# Robotic Walking

Desired Controller: Stable Walking

Safety-Critical Controller


$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$

Location of stepping stones =  $h(x)$




# Metabolic Cost Evaluated



**Main Idea: Barrier Functions for assist-as-needed control on exos**



# Eight Subjects Tested



$Human = u_{des}$



**Safety-Critical Controller**

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{des}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$

**Tubes around Trajectories =  $h(x)$**

# Barriers on Exo



# Back to the Big Picture



**Aerial Robots**

Invariance  
"avoid things"

## Safety-Critical Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u, \delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$


System components

High-level control

**Need: Unify high and low level methods**

Low-level control

Design models



$$\frac{d}{dt} \mathbf{x} = f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u})$$

**Control Barrier Functions**



**Ground Robots**







# Multi-Robot Coordination

Specifications

System components


Design models



Nilsson and AA, CDC 2018

Nilsson, Haesaert, Vasile, Thakker, Agha, Murray, AA, RSS 2018

# High Level Specifications




**Safety-Critical POMDPs**

$b^{t+1} = f(b^t), t \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$

$\mathcal{C} := \{b \in \mathcal{D} \mid h(b) \geq 0\}$

$\diamond(\text{GOAL}) \wedge_{i=1}^3 (\mathbb{P}_{\leq 0.05}(\text{OBS})_i)$











# Safe Multi-Robot Coordination

Specifications

System components

Design models




## Safety-Critical POMDPs

$$b^{t+1} = f(b^t), \quad t \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$$

$$\mathcal{C} := \{b \in \mathcal{D} \mid h(b) \geq 0\}$$

$$\diamond(\text{GOAL}) \wedge_{i=1}^3 (\mathbb{P}_{\leq 0.05}(\text{OBS})_i)$$



# Safe Multi-Robot Coordination




components

n-level control

level control

Design models



Control Barrier Functions

$$\frac{d}{dt} \mathbf{x} = f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u})$$

$$b^{t+1} := f(b^t) = \frac{O(q', a^t, z^{t+1}) \sum_{q \in \mathcal{Q}} T(q, a^t, q') b^t(q)}{\sum_{q' \in \mathcal{Q}} O(q', a^t, z^{t+1}) \sum_{q \in \mathcal{Q}} T(q, a^t, q') b^t(q)}$$

## Safety-Critical POMDPs

Dynamics:


$$b^{t+1} = f(b^t), \quad t \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$$

Safe Set:

$$\mathcal{C} := \{b \in \mathcal{D} \mid h(b) \geq 0\}$$


Specifications:

$$\diamond(\text{GOAL}) \wedge_{i=1}^3 (\mathbb{P}_{\leq 0.05}(\text{OBS})_i)$$






# Safe Multi-Robot Coordination: Discrete Time Barriers



components

Design models



**Control Barrier Functions**

### Safety-Critical POMDPs

**Dynamics:**  
 $b^{t+1} = f(b^t), \quad t \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$

**Safe Set:**  
 $\mathcal{C} := \{b \in \mathcal{D} \mid h(b) \geq 0\}$

**Specifications:**  
 $\diamond(\text{GOAL}) \wedge_{i=1}^3 (\mathbb{P}_{\leq 0.05}(\text{OBS})_i)$


**Theorem (Safety with Barrier Functions)**  
 For the system  $b^{t+1} = f(b^t)$ , the set  $\mathcal{C}$  is safe (forward invariant) if and only if there exists a discrete-time barrier function.



**Discrete Time Barrier Function (DTBF)**  
 $h : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a discrete time barrier function for the set  $\mathcal{C}$ , if there exists  $\alpha \in \mathcal{K}$  satisfying  $\alpha(r) < r$  for all  $r > 0$  with:


$$h(b^{t+1}) - h(b^t) \geq -\alpha(h(b^t)), \quad \forall b \in \mathcal{D}.$$

# Safe Multi-Robot Coordination: Composing Safe Sets



components

level control



### Safety-Critical POMDPs

**Dynamics:**  
 $b^{t+1} = f(b^t), \quad t \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}.$

**Safe Set:**  
 $\mathcal{C} := \{b \in \mathcal{D} \mid h(b) \geq 0\}$

**Specifications:**  
 $\diamond(\text{GOAL}) \wedge_{i=1}^3 (\mathbb{P}_{\leq 0.05}(\text{OBS})_i)$

**Proposition**

If there exist an  $\alpha \in \mathcal{K}$  satisfying  $\alpha(r) < r$  for all  $r > 0$  such that

$$\min_{i=1, \dots, k} h_i(b^{t+1}) - \min_{i=1, \dots, k} h_i(b^t) \geq -\alpha \left( \min_{i=1, \dots, k} h_i(b^t) \right)$$

then  $\mathcal{C}_\cap = \bigcap_i \mathcal{C}_i$  is forward invariant.


If there exist an  $\alpha \in \mathcal{K}$  satisfying  $\alpha(r) < r$  for all  $r > 0$  such that

$$\max_{i=1, \dots, k} h_i(b^{t+1}) - \max_{i=1, \dots, k} h_i(b^t) \geq -\alpha \left( \max_{i=1, \dots, k} h_i(b^t) \right)$$

then  $\mathcal{C}_\cup = \bigcup_i \mathcal{C}_i$  is forward invariant.



# Safe Multi-Robot Coordination: Safety Specifications



LDTL Specification	DTBF Implementation
$\omega^i \models A$	$h(b^i) = \sum_{q \in A} b^i(q) - 1$
$\omega^i \models \neg A$	$h(b^i) = \sum_{q \in Q \setminus A} b^i(q) - 1$
$\omega^i \models f$	$h(b^i) = -f(b^i) + \delta$
$\omega^i \models \neg f$	$h(b^i) = f(b^i)$
$\omega^i \models \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2$	$h(b^i) = \min\{h_1(b^i), h_2(b^i)\}$
$\omega^i \models \phi_1 \vee \phi_2$	$h(b^i) = \max\{h_1(b^i), h_2(b^i)\}$
$\omega^i \models \bigcirc \phi$	$h(b^{i+1}) = h_\phi(b)$
$\omega^i \models \phi_1 \mathcal{U} \phi_2$	$h_2(b^i) < 0 \implies h = h_1(b^i), \forall j \geq i$
$\omega^i \models \diamond \phi$	$h(b^i) = \tilde{h}(b^i), i \leq j \leq t^*$
$\omega^i \models \square \phi$	$h(b^i) = h_\phi(b^i), \forall j \geq i$

## Safety-Critical POMDPs

Dynamics:


$$b^{t+1} = f(b^t), \quad t \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$$

Safe Set:


$$\mathcal{C} := \{b \in \mathcal{D} \mid h(b) \geq 0\}$$

Specifications:

$$\diamond(\text{GOAL}) \wedge_{i=1}^3 (\mathbb{P}_{\leq 0.05}(\text{OBS})_i)$$



## Safety Specifications



# Safe Multi-Robot Coordination

## Safety-Critical POMDPs

Dynamics:



$$b^{t+1} = f(b^t), \quad t \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}.$$

Safe Set:

$$\mathcal{C} := \{b \in \mathcal{D} \mid h(b) \geq 0\}$$

Specifications:

$$\diamond(\text{GOAL}) \wedge_{i=1}^3 (\mathbb{P}_{\leq 0.05}(\text{OBS})_i)$$






# Safe Multi-Robot Coordination

Akella, Rosolia, Singletary and AA, CSL/ACC 2020 (submitted)


Both agents assigned to the task to increase the expected reward



Chen, Rosolia and AA, RAL/ICRA 2020 (submitted)




Rosolia and AA, CSL/CDC 2020



Rosolia, Singletary, Chen and AA, RAL/ICRA 2020 (submitted)



# Next Steps: Safe Multi-Robot Coordination






# Conclusion: Safety-Critical Autonomy


PD controller ONLY

- Stability:  $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$
- Safety:  $\dot{h}(x, u) \geq -\gamma h(x)$
- View toward autonomy
- Applications to a variety of domains



## Future Work:

- More underlying theory and synthesis
- Continue to apply experimentally
- Translate to real-world systems



# Conclusions – Next Steps



Walking Robots



Multi-Robot Systems



Collision Avoidance




Robotic Assistance

Specifications

Design model

Tasks  
"do things"



Variance  
"do things"

Low level

$$\frac{d}{dt} \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{B} \mathbf{u}$$

Plant




# Goal: Robust Safety



CBFs with uncertainty




Robust CBFs with uncertainty




Learning + CBFs

With Learning




Exploratory Control



No Learning




# Autonomy on Legged Robots





x0.4

Xiong, AA, IROS 2018



Top Speed: 1.04 m/s



Xiong, Reher, AA, ICRA 2020 (submitted)



## Lyapunov Controller

$$u^*(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(u,\delta) \in U \times \mathbb{R}} \|u - u_{\text{des}}(x)\|^2$$

s.t.  $\dot{V}(x, u) \leq -\alpha V(x)$

**+ Theorem  $\Rightarrow$  Stable Walking**





# Robotic Assistive Devices

RoAMS Initiative  
[www.roams.caltech.edu](http://www.roams.caltech.edu)





Aaron Ames / AMBER Lab

Caltech




# Learning + Control of Assistive Devices

## RNN Control





# Learning + Control of Assistive Devices



# Restoring Mobility



Caltech

**WANDERCRAFT**  
ORDINARY LIFE FOR EXTRAORDINARY PEOPLE



**Goal:** Safe Real World Autonomy



Thank You