

# Inner and outer approximations of tropical polytopes and their applications in tropical tensors

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IPAM WORKSHOP III: MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS AND ALGORITHMS FOR TENSOR COMPUTATIONS

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- A scalar acts on vector by “ $\lambda x$ ” =  $\lambda \odot x = \lambda + x$  entrywise.
- Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a matrix  $A$ :

$$A \odot v = \lambda + v$$

# Applications

Tropical tensors arise naturally:

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- Game theory
- Approximation theory
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A baby example:

- Given a direct-distances matrix  $A = (a_{ij})$ , find the longest distances.
- Consider  $A^2 = A \odot A$ , i.e.,

$$(A^2)_{ij} = \max_k (a_{ik} + a_{kj}),$$

which gives the longest path between  $i$  and  $j$  of length 2.

- $A + A^2 + \dots$  gives longest paths of all lengths.

- A decision maker and  $n$  local companies

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- Secret evaluation  $0 < f_i \leq 1$  (**technical quality**)
- The decision maker minimizes his expected cost:

$$\min_{i \in [n]} p_{ij} f_i^{-1}$$

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The prices constitute an equilibrium:

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Let  $V_{ij} = -\log(p_{ij})$  and  $a_i = \log(f_i)$ , the equilibrium is:

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will see later:  $\forall j \in [q], V_{\cdot j}$  lies in some hyperplane  $H_a$

Given tropical data, we would like to do

- Tropical linear regression:  
Given  $m$  points, find a hyperplane which best fits these data.
- Tropical tensor approximation:  
Given a tropical tensor, find a best rank-one approximation.

# Tropical cones

- $C \subseteq (\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n$  is a **tropical (convex) cone** if  $\forall x, y \in C, \forall \lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{\max}$ :  
 $\lambda + x \in C$  and  $\max(x, y) \in C$ .

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- For a set  $\mathcal{V} \subseteq (\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n$ , the tropical cone generated by  $\mathcal{V}$ :  
$$\text{Span}(\mathcal{V}) := \left\{ \sup_{v \in \mathcal{V}} (\lambda_v + v) \mid \lambda_v \in \mathbb{R}_{\max} \right\}.$$

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$$(\mathbb{R}_{\max}^n \setminus \{-\infty\}) / \sim,$$

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- A natural metric on  $\mathbb{P}(\mathbb{R}^n)$  is induced by **Hilbert's seminorm**:

$$\|z\|_H := \left( \max_{i \in [n]} z_i \right) - \left( \min_{i \in [n]} z_i \right).$$

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- Given  $A, B \subseteq \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n$ , the **one-sided Hausdorff distance**:

$$d_H(A, B) := \sup_{a \in A} \inf_{b \in B} \|a - b\|_H .$$

# Tropical hyperplanes

Given  $a \in \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n$ , we define the **tropical hyperplane**:

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


Figure: The hyperplane  $H_a$  with  $a = (0, 0, 1)^T$  and in  $\mathbb{P}(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^3$ .

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


Figure: The hyperplane  $H_a$  with  $a = (0, 0, 1)^\top$  and in  $\mathbb{P}(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^3$ .

Given a set  $\mathcal{V} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\max}^n$ , we solve **the tropical linear regression problem**:

$$\inf_{a \in \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n} d_H(\mathcal{V}, H_a) .$$

For a subset  $\mathcal{V}$  of  $(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n$ , the *inner radius* of  $\mathcal{V}$  is:

$$\text{in-rad}(\mathcal{V}) := \sup\{r \geq 0 \mid \exists b \in \mathbb{R}^n, B(b, r) \subseteq \text{Span}(\mathcal{V})\}.$$

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Theorem (Akian–Gaubert–Q.–Saadi)

$$\inf_{a \in \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n} d_H(\mathcal{V}, H_a) = \text{in-rad}(\mathcal{V}).$$

Question: how to compute  $\text{in-rad}(\mathcal{V})$ ?

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After  $\ell$  turns, under a strategy  $\sigma$  (resp.  $\tau$ ) of Min (resp. Max), if the sequence of actions is  $i, k_1, i_1, \dots, k_\ell, i_\ell$ , the total payment:

$$R_i^\ell(\sigma, \tau) = -V_{ik_1} + V_{i_1k_1} - V_{i_1k_2} - \dots + V_{i_\ell k_\ell}$$

The *value*  $v_i^\ell$  of the game at horizon  $\ell$  starting from  $i$ :

$$v_i^\ell := \min_{\sigma} \max_{\tau} R_i^\ell(\sigma, \tau) = \max_{\tau} \min_{\sigma} R_i^\ell(\sigma, \tau) .$$

# Shapley operator

*Shapley operator*  $T : (\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n \rightarrow (\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n$ ,

$$T_i(x) = \min_{k \in [p], V_{ik} \neq -\infty} \left[ -V_{ik} + \max_{j \in [n], j \neq i} (V_{jk} + x_j) \right], \quad i \in [n],$$

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- Complexity:  $\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$ .
- **Zwick and Paterson [1996]**: Value iteration (pseudo-polynomial time).
- Our case:  $\chi(T) \leq 0$ .

# Equivalence between tropical linear regression and MPG

The *spectral radius* of  $T$  is defined as

$$\rho(T) = \sup\{\lambda \in \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\} \mid \exists u \in (\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n, u \not\equiv -\infty, T(u) = \lambda + u\} .$$

## Theorem (Akian–Gaubert–Q.–Saadi)

$$\min_{a \in \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n} d_H(V, H_a) = -\rho(T) = \text{in-rad}(V)$$

Moreover,

- if  $T(a) \geq \rho(T) + a$ , then  $H_a$  is optimal
- if  $T(b) \leq \rho(T) + b$ , then  $B(-b, -\rho(T))$  is optimal

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## Corollary

The tropical linear regression problem is polynomial-time equivalent to the problem of solving a mean payoff game.

# Geometric illustration




Figure: A tropical cone  $\text{Sp}(\mathcal{V})$  with an optimal regression hyperplane  $H_a$  and an optimal inner ball  $B(-a, 1)$ , where  $a = (0, 0, 1)^\top$  satisfies  $T(a) = -1 + a$ .

# Revisit to equilibrium in ITT

Equilibrium:

$$\min_{i \in [q]} p_{ij} f_i^{-1} \text{ is achieved twice at least}$$

By letting  $V_{ij} = -\log(p_{ij})$  and  $a_i = \log(f_i)$ , the equilibrium is:

$$\max_{i \in [n]} (V_{ij} + a_i) \text{ is achieved at least twice,}$$

namely,


$$\forall j \in [q], \quad V_{\cdot j} \in H_a$$

In practice, we solve the **tropical linear regression problem**:

$$\min_{b \in \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n} d_H(V, H_b).$$

# Algorithm

- Goal:  $T(v) = \rho(T) + v$
- Algorithm: projective Krasnoselkii-Mann value iteration algorithm
  - Given  $\epsilon > 0$ , start with  $v^0 = (0, \dots, 0)^\top$ .
  - If  $\|T(v^k) - v^k\| \geq \epsilon$ , let
$$\tilde{v}^{k+1} = T(v^k) - (\max_{i \in [n]} T(v^k)_i) e,$$
$$v^{k+1} = (1 - \beta)v^k + \beta \tilde{v}^{k+1},$$
where  $e = (1, \dots, 1)^\top \in \mathbb{R}^n$  and  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  fixed.



## Theorem (Akian–Gaubert–Q.–Saadi)

Suppose that  $V \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times p}$  is finite, and let

$$W := \max_{k \in [p]} \|V_{\cdot, k}\|_H .$$

Then, an  $\epsilon$ -approximation of  $\text{in-rad}(V)$ , and vectors  $v, z \in \mathbb{R}^n$  satisfying

$$B_H(v, \text{in-rad}(\mathcal{V}) - \epsilon) \subseteq \text{Span}(V)$$

and

$$d_H(\text{Span}(V), H_z) \leq \text{in-rad}(\mathcal{V}) + \epsilon$$

can be obtained in  $O(npW/\epsilon)$  arithmetic operations.

# Outer radius

For a subset  $\mathcal{V}$  of  $(\mathbb{R}_{\max})^n$ , the *outer radius* of  $\mathcal{V}$  is:

$$\text{out-rad}(\mathcal{V}) := \inf\{r \geq 0 \mid \exists b \in \mathbb{R}^n, B(b, r) \supseteq \text{Span}(\mathcal{V})\}.$$

## Theorem (Akian–Gaubert–Q.–Saadi)

For any matrix  $V \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times p}$ , we have

$$\min_{A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times p}, \text{rank } A=1} \|V - A\|_{\infty} = \frac{1}{2} \text{out-rad}(\text{Span } V).$$

Question: how to compute  $\text{out-rad}(\text{Span } V)$ ?

# Reduction to eigenvalue problem

Given  $A \in (\mathbb{R}_{\max})^{n \times n}$ , define

$$A^* = I \oplus A \oplus A^2 \oplus \dots$$

For  $V \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times p}$ , let  $H = V \odot (-V^T) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ , where

$$H_{ik} = \max_{j \in [p]} (V_{ij} - V_{kj}), \quad i, k \in [n].$$

## Theorem (Akian–Gaubert–Q.–Saadi)

*$H$  has a unique eigenvalue, which equals  $\text{out-rad}(\text{Span } V)$ . Moreover, the set of centers of all Hilbert outer balls of  $\text{Span } V$  is the column space of  $(-\lambda + H)^*$ .*

# Kernel approximations

$X$ : compact metric,  $Y$ : nonempty,  $\mathcal{C}(X)$ : the space of continuous functions on  $X$ ,  $\mathcal{B}(Y)$ : the space of bounded functions on  $Y$ .

## Theorem (Akian–Gaubert–Q.–Saadi)

If  $V : X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  bounded and  $\{V(\cdot, y)\}_{y \in Y}$  equicontinuous, then

$$\inf_{f \in \mathcal{C}(X), g \in \mathcal{B}(Y)} \sup_{x \in X, y \in Y} |V(x, y) - f(x) - g(y)|$$

achieves an optimal solution, which is equal to one half of the tropical eigenvalue of  $H$ , where

$$H(x, z) = \sup_{y \in Y} (V(x, y) - V(z, y)) ,$$

and  $f$  is a tropical eigenvector of  $H$ .

- Tropical linear regression is equivalent to finding inner radius, which is polynomial-time equivalent to mean payoff game.
- Finding a best tropical rank-one approximation is equivalent to finding outer radius, which is equivalent to eigenvalue problem.

*Thank you for your attention!*